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I. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
In August 2003, Northeastern US and Ontario, Canada, experienced a cascading failure 
leading to large power blackout affecting about 50 million people with an estimated economic 
loss of around $4-$10 billion [1]. The blackout affected the power generation, water supply, 
transportation, communication, and industry operation. In September 2003, a black which lasted 
for more than two days affected more than 56 million people in Italy and Switzerland. The 
mobile communication failed, the power sources ran out of battery power, people were trapped 
on trains and flights were cancelled. An incident on European electricity network in November 
2006 has led to blackouts all over the grid. It affected 10 million people in Germany, France, 
Belgium, Spain and Austria. The main reason of this event was a fault in the transmission system 
[2]. Since power system blackouts have become a phenomenon which comes to be more 
important and causes a large series of consequences, people are seeking to improve the grid 
resilience and also well-designed backup power systems which have the capability to satisfy the 
demand of the customers. 
Micro-grids are becoming of more interest worldwide to achieve reliable electrical energy 
infrastructure during natural hazards and catastrophic situations due to their ability to operate in 
both grid-connected and islanded modes. They typically include distributed generation resources 
that could provide heat and electricity and are expected to have significant clean energy 
penetration.  
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1.2 Challenges 
A typical micro-grid system contains generators, transformers, transmission lines breakers, 
converters, and loads, and each of these can have different types of failures.     
Faults and failures can occur in the micro-grid without early warnings due to a wide range of 
possible events such as equipment failures, animal/tree contacts, falling trees, lightning strikes, 
malicious attacks, etc.. When a fault occurs in a certain region or part of the micro-grid system, 
other regions of the micro-grid may become overloaded or isolated through tripped switchgear 
due to load redistribution. This continuous load redistribution often leads to a cascading 
phenomenon that is propagated throughout the micro-grid system and in turn can lead to a 
catastrophic failure causing power disruptions even within the micro-grid itself and negative 
impacts on society especially that micro-grids are expected to be resilient. Examples of a failed 
solar photovoltaic and a failed transformer are shown in Fig.1. 
 
Fig.1 (a). Example of a failed solar photovoltaic panel due to degradation of the 
antireflection coating [3] 
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Fig.1 (b). Example of a failed transformer due to current arcing [4] 
“Reliability is the ability of an item to perform a required function, under given environment 
and operational conditions and for a stated period of time” (ISO8402) [5]. Micro-grid system 
reliability is critical for system design and maintenance since it is commonly used as a backup 
power system especially during the main grid blackouts or failures. The study of micro-grid 
reliability can give system designers, operators, and customers potential failure modes of its 
subsystems and components and can provide lifetime estimation by estimating the time before 
the first physical failure of the micro-grid. Therefore, reliability analysis of micro-grids is 
significant at both design and operation stages.  
1.3 Contribution 
Reliability theory has been widely used in system reliability analysis [6-10], but using 
reliability modeling and analysis methods to evaluate micro-grid reliability at a lower level than 
standard power systems has not been common in the literature. This thesis thus focuses on the 
intersection of system theory, reliability theory, and micro-grid concepts as illustrated in the 
shaded area in Fig.2, and on comparing various reliability modeling and analysis methods as 
applied to micro-grids. The main focus is on failure of physical components in a micro-grid 
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which is treated as a “system” and the effects of such failures on the micro-grid’s performance to 
meet a desired reliability objective, e.g. supporting a critical load. This approach is not common 
in the micro-grids literature and therefore several reliability modeling and analysis methods are 
applied to different micro-grids to illustrate their application methodology. The reliability 
modeling methods shown in this thesis can be applied for lifetime estimation and can therefore 
be used to enhance the micro-grid system’s reliability at the design stage. Since different 
methods have their own characteristics, they can complement each other when analyzing 
micro-grid reliability to fill gaps between each method’s capabilities and the other. It is important 
to note that failure rate numbers used later in the thesis are from literature references shown in 
the references section. However, the main objective of this thesis is to illustrate how micro-grids 
can be treated as systems for reliability purposes to open up a system-theoretic and 
reliability-theoretic door for micro-grid reliability modeling and analysis rather than provide 
numerical answers to micro-grid reliability evaluation or prediction. It is also important to note 
that stochastic loads and resources (e.g. wind, solar irradiance) are not considered in this thesis 
but are essential for future work. 
Reliability 
Theory
System 
Theory
Micro-grid 
Concepts
 
Fig.2. Highlighted focus area where system and reliability theories are applied to micro-grid 
concepts 
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Reliability metrics such as mean time to failure (MTTF), reliability function R(t), the failure 
rate (), mean residual life (MRL), component importance (I), and component’s success 
probability can be used to iteratively “design for reliability” and system hardening for 
operational and economic benefits. An example introducing an approach to design for reliability 
is also presented to illustrate how one of the reliability methods introduced can be applied to 
choose a design power electronic converter for micro-grids. 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter II reviews major faults in micro-grid components 
and introduces RBD, FTA and MRM methods as applied to a simple three-component system. 
Chapter III describes micro-grids used as case studies. Three methods applied for reliability 
modeling and analysis of the University of Connecticut micro-grid are described, and the results 
are shown in Chapter IV. Chapter V shows King’s Plaza and New York University micro-grids 
reliability analysis results. An example introducing a design-for-reliability approach is in Chapter 
VI. In Chapter VII, discussions of the results are presented along with brief comparison of the 
three methods, and Chapter VIII is the conclusion. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Review of the Major Faults in the Micro-grid System 
An example of a micro-grid is shown in Fig. 3 and includes the integration of sensing, 
communication and control technologies with distributed power generation systems. This forms 
an efficient and reliable micro power system that is capable of delivering power even in the event 
of failures on the main utility grid. Micro-grids are configured as DC or AC grids connected to 
low or medium voltage distribution networks [11]. Clean energy generation systems commonly 
include wind turbines, photovoltaic (PV) panels, and fuel cells. Conventional generation systems, 
e.g. diesel or natural gas generators, are used when clean energy systems cannot provide 
sufficient power or are highly intermittent. Most distributed generation systems require power 
electronic converters to connect to building loads or the utility grid and are mainly 
interconnected through cables and possibly distribution-level transmission lines forming a 
unified power system for local load support. Before providing a review of the reliability analysis 
methods, it is useful to have a detailed understanding of the fault universe of the micro-grid’s 
electrical energy infrastructure. Table 1 summarizes the components reviewed in this thesis, their 
failure modes, and their effects. This literature review has already been published in [12]. 
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Fig.3. Micro-grid infrastructure [12] 
A.  Photovoltaic (PV) Panels:  
Solar cells generate renewable energy from solar radiation and they consist of glass, metals, 
polymers and a semiconductor. Faults associated with PV panels include module and cell faults. 
PV panel failures mainly causes gradual reduction in output power over time or an overall 
reduction in power due to failure of an individual solar cell in the module.  
Module faults [13] include open circuits, short circuits, fractured glass and delamination. 
Open circuit typically occur in bus wiring and between junction boxes that tie PV panels. Often, 
manufacturing, transportation and installation defects, and insulation degradation with weather, 
result in open or short circuits, delamination, cracking or electrochemical corrosion. Short 
circuits also can occur when panels face severe weather, such as wind, hail, snow, sand, salt, dust 
and humidity. The top of PV panels is glass, thus exposing it to the outside may shatter it due to 
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vandalism, thermal stress, handling, wind or hail. Delamination results from the loss of adhesion 
between the encapsulant and other front surface material of the modules. 
Cell failures consist of solar cell degradation, short and open circuited cells, interconnect 
open circuits and hot spot failure. Solar cell degradation is the most significant one. Degradation 
of PV cells, modules and panels can be caused by [14]: 
1. Front surface soiling: dirty shading the surface of the cells; Impurities on the surface will 
lead to partial shading of the cell; 
2. Optical degradation of the encapsulation material: When exposed to UV-light, 
temperature changes, or humidity, the encapsulating material of the cell can discolorate; 
3. Increase in the cells’ series resistance: cells are exposed to the outside environment with 
variation in temperature and irradiation over time, which lead to an increase of the series 
resistance. Although series resistance is low by design, it can originate from resistances 
in the solder bonds, emitter and base regions, cell metallization, and others; 
4. Decrease in the cell shunt resistance: crystal damage and impurities in and near the inter 
junction may cause this decrease. While exposing to light for a longer time, the total 
number of shunts can increase. With a large number of shunts, the shunt current 
increases and resistance decreases; 
5. Degradation of the cells’ anti-reflection coating: This occurs when the PV cells are used 
for a long time and reduces the efficiency of the cells since less photons are absorbed for 
power generation;  
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6. Mismatch of cells: This often occurs when cells are connected in series. If a cell is 
partially shaded, it can be forced by the other cells to operate in the negative voltage 
region where it dissipates power instead of producing it. Cell mismatch in general leads 
to heating of the cells, which in turn can accelerate degradation of this and other cells; 
7. Temperature and light induced degradation: With high temperature, the bandgap of the 
cells will decrease, which will allow the cells to absorb more photons but decrease the 
open circuit voltage (Voc).  
Short circuited cells occur across the cell’s inner connections, which is a common failure 
mode since top and rear contacts are much closer together with each other and more chance of 
being shorted together by impurities. Open circuited cells mainly occur due to corrosion and 
result in an increased resistance of the cell. Cell cracking can be caused by thermal stress and 
hail. Cyclic thermal stress and wind loading lead to interconnect open circuit failures. Hot-spot 
failures happen when the operating current of the cell is too large. By-pass diode failure 
operation is mainly due to overheating.  
In the grid connected mode, the reliability of PV inverters is important. Failure of a PV 
inverter may affect the PV array, the power conversion efficiency, and the amount of power 
going into the micro-grid. Two main fault types are open-circuit and short-circuit faults in 
inverter components. They can occur in the switch, MOSTETs, IGBTs and other components. 
Degradation faults in DC link capacitors are also common in central micro-inverters [15]. 
B.  Diesel and Gas Generators:  
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Diesel and gas generators can be used as alternative power sources on a micro-grid in the 
event of a power grid failure. They use a diesel or gas engine which spins the shaft of the electric 
generator. Very little research has been reported on the types of failures for the whole diesel or 
gas generator as a system, however the diesel engine and electric generator failures have been 
widely considered.  
Diesel and gas engines are subject to fuel leakage, bearing failures, and cracked crankshaft 
failures. A cracked crankshaft is caused by corrosion or poor assembly and can lead to an 
inability to generate rotational energy [16]. Fuel leakage causes a decrease in fuel pressure 
leading to a reduction in the combustion efficiency [17]. Bearing faults are caused by fatigue and 
metal-to-metal contact and occur in a similar fashion to that of the wind turbine generator 
bearing faults.  
Electric generator failures consist of rotor and stator failures. Stator may fail due to single or 
multiple phase short circuit, inter-turn short circuit [18], saturation, stator winding ground, and 
air gap eccentricity [19]. The open or short circuits lead to internal asymmetry which causes 
extremely high currents in windings thus leading to the degradation of other parts in stator. 
Inter-turn short circuits are caused by the combination of thermal, electrical, mechanical and 
environmental stresses. The main effects of stator faults are unbalanced air gap voltage and line 
currents, disturbances in the current voltage and flux waveforms, increased losses and reduction 
in efficiency and excessive heating. Rotor failures consist of inter-turn and inter-slot short and 
open circuit, rotor ground, air gap eccentricity, rotor windings and bending failure. Rotor ground 
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faults can have several reasons: weakness in the original design, a problem in phases, or the 
ageing problem. These cause unbalanced air-gap fluxes and line currents, excessive heating, 
disturbances in the current, voltage and flux waveforms at last reductions of efficiency. Air 
eccentricity is caused by the formation of different air gap thicknesses between the stator and 
rotor. In general, two types of air-gap eccentricity faults exist: static and dynamic air-gap 
eccentricity. Static eccentricity can be caused by stator or rotor positioning incorrectly and oval 
stator cores. A cause of dynamic eccentricity can be a bent shaft, bearing wear and movement, 
misalignment of bearings, or mechanical resonances at critical speeds.  
C.  Fuel Cells:  
Proton Exchange Membrane (PEM) fuel cells are the most common type of fuel cells, that 
generate clean electric power from the chemical energy emitted from the reaction of hydrogen 
and oxygen. They consist of the membrane, electro-catalyst, catalyst, and gas diffusion layers 
which are subject to degradation faults [20]. These layers fail due to mechanical, thermal and 
chemical degradations. Mechanical degradations cause perforations due to improper membrane 
electrode assembly and humidity cycling. Thermal degradations are caused by a change in 
hydrations, flooding, and dehydration [21], due to operating at temperatures beyond the rated 
operating range. Chemical degradations are formed by the presence of foreign cationic ions due 
to combustion between hydrogen and oxygen. Other failure modes include degradations in the 
bipolar plate and sealing gasket. Bipolar plate degradation is caused by corrosion and generally 
leads to a drop in the output voltage. Sealing gasket degradation is caused by force retention 
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compression loss leading to plate electrical shorting. Fuel cells require compressors to supply air 
throughout the cell. Compressors also tend to degrade and lock up resulting in a reduced or loss 
of air flow through the cell [22]. These typically occur due to increased friction in the 
compressor motor and overheating. In general, fuel cell faults lead to a reduction in generation 
efficiency, and reduction or loss of output power.  
D.  Wind turbines:  
Wind turbines are subject to failures in the following systems: 1) Gearbox and bearing, 2) 
Generator, 3) Power electronics and controls, and 4) Rotors, blades and hydraulic controls [23].  
Gearbox and bearing faults are the leading causes of wind turbine failures due to mechanical 
stresses and environmental conditions [24]. Repairing or replacing a damaged gearbox is a 
difficult and time consuming process which causes significant downtime. Gearbox failures are 
mainly caused by lack of lubrication, wear of materials, and failures of bearings. Bearing faults 
typically consist of inner/outer race and ball faults and occur due to abrasive wear, corrosion, 
lack of lubrication, and accumulation of debris contaminates [25]. 
Generator failures are caused by bearing, stator, rotor and air gap faults and lead to 
unbalanced harmonics, reduction in efficiency, decreased average torque, and excessive heating 
of the windings. Most wind turbines use the induction generators. Faults in the induction 
generator may produce unbalanced stator voltages and currents, decreased average torque, 
excessive heating, and low efficiency [26-27].  
Power electronics and electric control failures occur due to semiconductor device faults 
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which include short and open circuits, gate drive circuit faults, and wiring damages. Rotors and 
blades fail due to corrosion, mechanical damages, and manufacturing defects. Corrosion leads to 
cracked rotors while mechanical damages caused by ice, lighting, insects, etc. can lead to 
roughness on the blades’ surface causing a loss in efficiency and change in stiffness. Hydraulic 
control failures cause a reduction of fluid due to air contamination resulting in a leak causing 
failures in the rotor blades and bearings [28-29].  
E. Cables and Transmission Lines 
Power cables are essential interconnections between distributed generation and loads in a 
micro-grid, but distribution-level transmission lines may also be used. Power cables are typically 
installed underground while transmission lines are installed overhead. Underground cables are 
subjected to mechanical faults and usual wear and tear, while overhead lines are exposed to 
natural events that can cause faults such as due to lighting strikes, icing, short circuits, 
overloading, equipment failures, aging, animal/tree contact, human actions, lack of maintenance, 
etc. [30]. Three most common types of faults include: i) single line-to-ground, ii) three-phase–to 
-ground, and iii) line-to-line. The first two occur due to one or three phase(s) short circuiting to 
ground by physical contact. Line-to-line faults occur due to a short circuit between two phases 
and are commonly caused by broken insulation or loose connection  
F. Transformers 
Transformers are electrical components that can be used for energy transfer by 
electromagnetic induction between two circuits. The faults in transformers can be very dangerous. 
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The common causes of transformer failures are lighting surges, line surges or external short 
circuit, poor workmanship-manufacturer, deterioration of insulation, overloading, moisture, 
inadequate maintenance, sabotage, malicious mischief, and loose connection.  
A transformer mainly has the following subcomponents: core, winding, tank, bushing, tap 
changer, and cooling system. DC magnetization or displacement of the core steel during the 
construction can cause the core failure. It will reduce the transformer’s efficiency. A fault in the 
winding can occur due to material faults in the cellulose isolation, construction fault, transient 
overvoltage, and movement of transformer. Careless handing/move, high pressure due to gas 
generation, and corrosion may cause the tank failure. The main failure mode of the bushing is 
short circuit. Old capacitors in the motor cause the tap changer fail to control its movement 
direction. The motor in the tap changer can breakdown because of over voltage. Cooling system 
will reduce the heat produced in transformers due to copper and iron losses. The failures in the 
cooling system may increase the heat in the transformer which can affect different parts of the 
transformer [31-32].  
G. Switchgears 
Switchgears are electrical devices that include electrical switches, fuses or circuit breakers. 
They are used to control, protect, and isolate electrical equipment. Failures of switchgear can 
cause serious injury and damage. 
Loose connection is one of the switchgear failures causes, loose and faulty connections can 
cause an increase of resistance at that localized point. The increased resistance causes increased 
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heat and will escalate until complete thermal failure of the connection occurs. Insulation 
breakdowns are likely to occur in jumper cables, bus, and cable terminations. Water immersion 
due to natural disasters or accidents can lead to instant short circuits, long term insulation 
damage, and long term metallic component corrosion [33]. The breaker racking may also cause 
serious injury or damage. A defective ground fault protective device will not offer protection 
from the ground fault and will cause failures of the switchgear. 
H. Inverters and Converters 
The reliability of power electronic inverters and converters is a major concern in power 
system because of their high failure rates. Faults are likely to occur in each of the subcomponents 
in a converter or inverter during operation, such as MOSFET, rectifier diode, inverter diode, 
reactor, and capacitor or inductor. Each component can develop two main types of faults: open 
circuit and short circuit. 
Three main causes of the failures are capacitor wear, overuse and over/under voltage. 
Inverter and converter rely on capacitor to provide smooth output power at different levels of 
current. The failure in capacitor itself can be a cause of inverter /converter failure. Over using the 
inverter/converter beyond their operation limit can contribute to their failures. If the current or 
voltage increases to a higher level than the rated inverter/converter threshold value, it can also 
cause damage to the components.   
Thermal stresses, overload transients, extreme ambient temperature, moisture, and 
mechanical vibration are the other causes of the converter and inverter failures. The failures in 
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the converter and inverter can produce a very high transient, an over voltage stress or a rapid 
voltage decreasing [34].  
Table I summarizes major failure modes, causes, and effects of major micro-grid 
components. 
TABLE 1. FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS OF THE ELECTRICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE OF 
MAJOR COMPONENTS IN MICRO-GRIDS 
Component Sub- 
component 
Failure Mode Cause Effect 
PV Panel  Cell  Degradation 
 Short/Open circuit 
cell 
 Interconnect open  
circuit cell 
 Hot spots 
 Over exposer 
 Decrease in cell shunt 
resistance 
 Debris accumulation on 
the surface  
 Mismatched cells 
 Overheating 
 Loss/reduction 
of output 
power 
 Decrease in 
voltage and 
current 
waveforms 
 Module   Open/Short circuits 
 Glass fracture  
 Delamination 
 Manufacturing defects, 
mechanical loads, 
corrosion 
 Natural occurrences 
 Degradation of cells 
anti-reflection coating 
 Overheating 
By-Pass Diode  Open/Short circuit  Overheating 
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Component Sub- 
component 
Failure Mode Cause Effect 
Diesel and 
Gas 
Generators 
Stator and  
Rotor 
 Single/Multi-phase  
 Short circuit 
 Inter-turn short circuit 
 Air-gaps 
 Grounding 
 Bending/broken rotor 
 Demagnetization 
 Insulation damage 
leading to winding 
interconnections 
 Reduction of lubrication 
 Manufacturing defects 
 Overheating 
 
 Phase shift 
 Unbalanced 
voltage and 
current 
waveforms 
 Reduction in 
efficiency 
 Decreased gas 
pressure and 
combustion 
efficiency 
 Increased 
vibration 
 Decreased 
efficiency 
 
Fuel line Leaking  Holes/air contamination 
Bearings  Inner race 
 Outer race 
 Ball 
 Vibration, High speeds 
 Wear, mechanical loads 
&contamination 
 Electric arcing 
 Lack of lubrication 
 Misalignment 
Crankshaft  Cracked crankshaft  Fatigue 
 Corrosion 
 Manufacture defects 
 
Component Sub- 
component 
Failure Mode Cause Effect 
Fuel cell 
 
 
 
 
Membrane, 
Electrocatalyst, 
and gas 
diffusion layers 
 Mechanical 
degradation 
 Thermal degradation 
 Chemical degradation 
 Perforation, cracks, 
tears, or pinholes 
 Humidity cycling 
 Flooding/drying 
 Reduction in 
efficiency 
 Loss of output 
power 
 Decrease in 
voltage and 
current 
waveforms 
Bipolar Plate  Loss of conductivity  Corrosion 
Sealing Gasket  Mechanical failure 
Compressor  Degradation  Increased friction 
Motor  Locked  Overheating 
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Component Sub- 
component 
Failure Mode Cause Effect 
Wind Turbine Gearbox  Bearing-inner/outer 
race and ball faults 
Corrosion and 
contamination 
 Unbalanced 
voltage and 
current 
waveforms 
 Reduction in 
efficiency 
 Decreased 
torque 
 Phase shift 
 Increased 
vibration 
 
 
Generator  Bearing 
 Stator inter turn short 
circuit 
 Cracked rotor 
 Air gaps 
 Demagnetization 
 Corrosion, 
contamination, 
manufacturing 
defects 
 Overheating 
 Reduction of fluid 
 Insulation damage 
Power 
electronics and 
electric control 
 Semiconductor 
short/open circuit 
 Over voltage of 
components 
 Manufacturing 
defects 
Blades  Degradation  Corrosion 
 Change in stiffness 
Hydraulic 
control 
 Fuel leak  Air contamination 
and mechanical 
defects 
Cable and 
Transmission  
Lines 
  Single line to ground 
 Double line to ground 
 Line to line 
 Physical contact 
between one/two 
phases with 
ground/animal/tree 
 Broken insulators 
 Natural events 
 Overloading 
 Introduces fault 
currents leading 
to tripped 
breaker, 
shutting off 
power flow 
Transformer 
 
 
 
 
Winding  Wind failure 
  Dielectric faults 
 
 Copper line 
resistance thermal 
losses  
 DC magnetization 
 Loosening of 
conductors 
 Sealing breaking  
 
 
 Reduce the 
transformer’s 
efficiency 
 Loss of output 
power 
 Black out of 
power 
 
 
Core  Mechanical failure 
 
Tank  Shaft connection 
Bushing  Loosen of conductors 
 Sealing breaking 
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Component Sub- 
component 
Failure Mode Cause Effect 
Switchgear  
 
 Thermal failure 
 Overstressed 
 Short circuit 
 Loose connection  
 Water intrusion or 
immersion 
 Jumper cables and 
cable terminations 
insulation breakdown 
 Partial discharge 
activity 
 Burning oil and 
gas clouds 
 Explosion 
 
Inverter and 
converter 
MOSFET  Open circuit 
 Short circuit 
 
 Electro-mechanical 
wear on capacitors 
 Overuse 
 Over and under 
voltage 
 Ultrasonic vibrations 
 Reduce the 
efficiency 
 Loss of output 
power 
Rectifier diode 
Inverter diode 
Reactor 
Capacitor/ 
inductor 
2.2 Review of Major Reliability Modeling and Analysis Methods for Micro-grid Systems 
“Reliability is the ability of an item to perform a required function, under given environment 
and operational conditions and for a stated period of time” (ISO8402). Power system reliability 
is critical for system design and maintenance and can give system designers, operators, and 
customers potential failure modes of the subsystems and components.  
Main reliability modeling methods include Failure Modes, Effect and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA or FMEA), Cause and Effect Diagrams (CEDs), Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs), 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Stochastic Petri Nets (SPNs), 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Markov Reliability Modeling (MRM) and Reliability Block 
Diagrams (RBD). FMECA is an inductive bottom-up method to identify potential failure modes 
and study effects of failures by focusing on components in a system and examining how fault 
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modes of each component [35]. CED is used as a quality analysis method to find potential causes 
for system failures where causes are arranged based on their importance [36]. BBN uses 
probability distribution allocated to the causal factors to evaluate a network’s performance 
quantitatively [37]. ETA is an inductive technique that examines an initiating event and its 
possible deviation then explores how this deviation may develop [38]. FTA is a top-down 
deductive failure analysis approach commonly used to determine root causes of failures where 
failures and their modes are connected with logic gates and binary numbers [39]. ETA and FTA 
focus on opposite sides of an undesired event where ETA focuses on the consequences after the 
event while FTA focuses on causes leading to that event. PRA is based on three basic questions: 
what parts can fail, what are the detriments, and what are the possibilities that these undesirable 
events happen [10]? SPN is a dynamic reliability analysis tool used to describe the relations 
between events and conditions [41]. RBD is another method for studying reliability and can be 
implemented in parallel with any physical block diagram [42]. MRM is focused on probabilistic 
transitions between healthy, intermediate, and failed states of a system. Approaches discussed in 
this thesis are RBD, FTA, and MRM due to their common application and easy implementation 
in electrical energy systems. Details of these three methods will be introduced in 2.2.2-2.2.4 
2.2.1 Quantitative Measures for Reliability [5] 
A. Time to Failure 
   We assume that the time to failure T is continuously distributed with probability density 
function f(t). Distribution function F(t) denotes the probability that the item fails within the 
time interval (0, t]. 
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F t T t f u du                           (2.1) 
B. Reliability Function 
  Reliability is the probability that the system survives at a time T>t. The reliability 
function of an item is defined by  
                    ( ) 1 ( )R t F t                                 (2.2) 
R(t) is the probability that the item does not fail in the time interval (0, t]. 
C. Failure Rate Function 
The probability that an item will fail in the time interval (t, t + Δt] when we know that the 
item is functioning at time t is 
   
Pr( ) ( ) ( )
Pr( )
Pr( ) ( )
t T t t F t t F t
t T t t
T t R t
    
    

      (2.3) 
D. Mean Time to Failure 
   The time elapsing from when the item is put into operation until it fails for the first time is 
called the time to failure. The mean time to failure of an item is defined by 
                        
0
( )MTTF R t dt

                                   (2.4)           
E. The Exponential Distribution 
If an item that is put into operation at time t = 0, the time to failure T of the item has a 
probability density function 
               
0 , 0
( )
0
te for t
f t
otherwise
   
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
                     (2.5) 
This distribution is called the exponential distribution with parameter λ and the reliability 
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function of the item and MTTF are  
               ( ) Pr( ) ( )d
t
t
R t T t f u u e 

                    (2.6)           
                  
0 0
1
( ) tMTTF R t dt e dt

 
                            (2.7) 
Note that, in the thesis, all the failure distributions are assumed to have exponential 
distributions. 
2.2.2 Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) Method 
RBD is a system-level reliability analysis method and can be implemented in parallel with 
an electrical or other physical layouts or block diagrams by considering the function of each 
component or subsystem. RBD simplifies the reliability modeling process since the order of fault 
occurrence does not affect the model and thus eliminates exponential growth in system states 
which could occur when considering fault occurrence sequences. RBDs are suitable for systems 
of non-repairable components and where the order of the failures does not matter. Engineers can 
easily construct, modify, and verify the RBD based on the construction of the system. There are 
series structures, parallel structures and k-out-of-n structures in RBDs. A series connection is 
joined by one path from the “in” node to the “out” node, a parallel connection is joined by 
multiple paths, and k-out –of –n is functioning if at least k of n components are functioning or 
healthy. Fig. 4 shows a simple RBD of a system of three components (A, B, and C), and multiple 
paths from the “In” point to the “Out” point. 
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A
B
CIn Out. . ..
 
Fig.4. A simple RBD example 
  Consider a non-repairable system with n series independent components with failure rates λi, 
for i=1, . . . , n , then equations (2.8) and (2.9) show the R(t) and MTTF expressions, while for 
parallel components, (2.10) and (2.11) are shown. Therefore for Fig. 4, if λ1 is the failure rate of 
“a”, λ2 is the failure rate of “b”, and λ3 is the failure rate of “c”, R(t) and MTTF of the diagram in 
Fig. 4 become (2.12) and (2.13). 
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2.2.3 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Method 
FTA explicitly shows all different failure modes that are necessary to result in the top event 
and constructing the fault tree gives a thorough understanding of the logic and basic causes 
leading to the top event. FTA can give a qualitative and quantitative evaluation of system. Fig.5 
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shows the fault tree with “AND” gates, “OR” gates, and events of the diagram in Fig.4. An 
advantage of FTA is that when accurate failure rates are difficult to acquire for a quantitative 
analysis, qualitative analysis can be achieved using the structure importance coefficient of 
components or subsystems. The structure importance coefficient is IΦ(i) calculated as  
                     
( ) 1
1
1 (1 )
2 ji j
i N
X K
I 
   
                           (2.14) 
where Kj is the cut-set, Nj (j∈Kj) is the number of basic events in the cut-set which includes the 
basic event i; and Xi ∈ Kj is the basic event i which belongs to the cut set. One important concept 
used in FTA is the cut-set: It is a list of basic events such that if they occur then the top event 
occurs. Two other common methods used in FTA are Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis (FFTA) and 
Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS).  
In order to overcome the limitation of the failure probability or relationship between events, 
fuzzy numbers are used to describe the probability of an event to occur. FTA-MCS can combine 
the practical experience from engineering and technical personnel of the practical experience to 
construct fuzzy membership functions. The common used fuzzy numbers are the triangular fuzzy 
number, the trapezoidal fuzzy number, the cusp fuzzy number and the normal fuzzy number. 
However, in complex power systems, the use of FTA increases in complexity with a large 
number of basic components and logic gates. MCS is thus a powerful tool to evaluate the 
reliability of a system by generating random values of uncertain variables and scanning the fault 
tree thousands of times to get more accurate results. While MCS is computationally intensive, it 
can accurately predict fault propagation in a fault tree and thus evaluate a system’s reliability. To 
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apply the MCS to a fault tree, Monte Carlo random sampling is applied, typically in software 
such as MATLAB, through a random number between 0 and 1 to obtain the failure time of each 
basic component. 
 
C
A B
Logic Gates
Top Event
Intermediate
Event
Basic
Event  
Fig.5. A simple fault tree diagram example 
2.2.4 Markov Reliability Modeling (MRM) Method 
MRM uses a stochastic process to model the system with several states and transitions 
between states. A Markov reliability model contains a series of the possible states in the system 
and uses possible failure rates and repair rates between those states. If X(t) is denoted as a 
random variable in Markov process, then Pij of transitioning probability from state “i” at t=0 to 
state “j” at t is Pij=P[X(t)=j |X(0)=i]. The probability of transitioning from state “i” to state “j” 
does not depend on the global time and only depends on the transition time interval. A simple 
Markov process for Fig.4 is shown in Fig. 6. The states in Fig. 6 (a) show transition from state 0 
which is the healthy state to state 1 when component A fails but the system survives, state 2 
when component B fails but the system survives, and state 3 when component C fails and the 
system fails since component C ties the rest of the system to the output. Staying at a state means 
that no new fault even happened. State 3 is an absorbing state of system failure since every 
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physical system is expected to fail at some point in time. Fig. 6 (b) shows failure rates λ and 
recovery rates μ. Equations (2.15) and (2.16) show the probability of transitioning between 
different states and the state transition matrix, respectively.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
     Fig.6. Markov-based state diagram using MRA for the system in Fig. 4 
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(2.16) 
  MRM can be simulated based on the failure rates of components and the system state 
transition matrix. But this method is suitable for small size systems since it is hard to get higher 
dimension matrices and the corresponding derivation for all the possible states. Take the three 
component system as an example; to implement this method, all the possible states of the three 
components in Fig.4 and Fig.5 need to be known, as shown in Table 2. Details of this method 
can be found in Section 4.3. 
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TABLE 2 SYSTEM STATES AND RELIABILITY 
 A 
R(1) 
B 
R(2) 
C 
R(3) 
System  
State 
Probability of the state  
at time t 
0 Success Success Success Success  
1 Success Success Failure Failure  
2 Success Failure Success Success  
3 Failure Success Success Success  
4 Success Failure Failure Failure  
5 Failure Success Failure Failure  
6 Failure Failure Success Failure  
7 Failure Failure Failure Failure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
00 1 2 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P t R t R t R t  
01 1 2 3( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ( ))P t R t R t R t   
02 1 2 3( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( )P t R t R t R t   
03 1 2 3( ) (1 ( )) ( ) ( )P t R t R t R t   
04 1 2 3( ) ( ) (1 ( )) (1 ( ))P t R t R t R t    
05 1 2 3( ) (1 ( )) ( ) (1 ( ))P t R t R t R t    
06 1 2 3( ) (1 ( )) (1 ( )) ( )P t R t R t R t    
07 1 2 3( ) (1 ( )) (1 ( ) (1 ( ))P t R t R t R t     
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III. MICRO-GRID CASE STUDIES 
Micro-grids are becoming of more interest worldwide to achieve reliable electrical energy 
infrastructure during natural hazards and catastrophic situations due to their ability to operate in 
either grid-connected or islanded modes. They typically include distributed generation resources 
that could provide heat and electricity. Three case studies are considered to illustrate the 
proposed reliability modeling and analysis methods. The first case study is a micro-grid system 
at University of Connecticut which has a synchronous interconnection and significant clean 
energy penetration. The second and the third micro-grids are at King’s Plaza Mall (KP) and New 
York University (NYU). The King’s Plaza micro-grid utilizes a non-synchronous interconnection 
strategy using the GridLink technology [43], while the NYU micro-grid has a synchronous 
interconnection, but with no clean energy penetration and is at a large scale. 
3.1 Case Study #1: Micro-grid with significant clean energy penetration at University of 
Connecticut (UConn) 
The micro-grid system under study consists of two photovoltaic (PV) arrays each rated at 3.3 
kW, one fuel cell (FC) rated up to 400 kW, two diesel generators (DG) each rated at 150 kW, 
three buildings with variable loads, interconnecting power electronic converters and 
transformers, and a point of common coupling (PCC) between the micro-grid and utility as 
shown in Fig.7. The critical loads can get supply from either micro-grid or utility. An important 
note is that in this thesis, all the devices are assumed to be of equal operational value to the 
overall system.  
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Fig. 7. One line diagram of micro-grid being analyzed for reliability 
  Three different reliability objectives with different models are using in the first case. RBD, 
FTA, and MRM were applied to analyze the reliability of the micro-grids shown in Fig. 8. The 
failure rates shown in Table 3 are estimated from the literature [44-52] and are used here for 
illustrative purposes. In the calculations and simulations below, the failure rate of the critical 
load is assumed to be 2.2831x10
-6
 failures/hour or once in 50 years. Since it is difficult to get 
exact failure rates of all the components in a real system, warranty information is also used to 
estimate some failure rates. It is important to note that failure rate values can be updated or 
adjusted but the methodology remains the same. 
A. The first objective:  
The first objective of the micro-grid is to support a 3.3kW critical load in Fig.8 (a). The 
critical load is assumed to be at medium voltage in between the utility grid and micro-grid. In the 
micro-grid system, there always exits a critical load that is expected to receive power at all times. 
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If the critical load does not receive electrical power, the overall system is assumed to be in a 
failed state. 
 
Fig.8 (a). Micro-grid diagram for the first objective: supporting a 3.3kW critical load 
B. The second objective:  
The second objective of this case is to support a 150kW critical load in Fig.8 (b). Under this 
situation, PV systems will not affect the overall system reliability due to their low output power. 
Thus, PV panels and their interconnecting devices and converters are not considered in this case.   
 
Fig.8 (b). Micro-grid diagram for the second objective: supporting a 150kW critical load  
C. The third objective:  
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The third objective is to support a 400kW critical load in Fig. 8 (c). Here PV and DG are 
not considered since their low output power compared to the critical load. 
 
Fig.8 (c). Micro-grid diagram for the third objective: supporting a 400kW critical load 
TABLE 3. FAILURE RATES USED TO ESTIMATE THE MICRO-GRID MTTF [44-52] 
Component 
 
Failure rate 
(failures/hour) 
Component Failure rate 
(failures/hour) 
PV Panel 4.5662 x10
-6
  Diesel Generator 11.4155 x10
-6
 
DC/DC 14.2694 x10
-6
 Start Generator 11.4155 x10
-6
 
DC/AC 14.2694 x10
-6
 Transmission system 2.2831 x10
-6
 
Breaker 2.2831 x10
-6
 PCC 2.2831 x10
-6
 
Fuel cell 14.2694 x10
-6
 Loads 2.2831 x10
-6
 
3.2 Case Study #2: Non-synchronous Micro-grid at King’s Plaza (KP) 
 The one-line diagram of the KP non-synchronous micro-grid is shown in Fig. 9, there are two 
parallel feeders, each having two transmission parts and one Gridlink (back to back) 
inverter/rectifier. Four gas engines and two spare diesel generators (not existing in real system) 
which are distributed generators are in the “Generators” block. Under healthy operating 
conditions, two feeders support the King’s Plaza Mall (load) together while Con-Edison (the 
utility grid) is available, but when Con-Edison fails, the generators will support the King’s Plaza 
Mall (load) instead. The reliability analysis objective in this study is to support the King’s Plaza 
Mall in Fig. 9.  
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Fig.9. King’s Plaza one line diagram 
3.3 Case Study #3: Large Synchronous Micro-grid at New York University (NYU) 
The NYU micro-grid system is shown in Fig. 10, Central Heating Plant, Silver Tower Garage 
and Broadway Block Substation NO.3 are assumed to be three critical loads for the sake of 
illustration and since heating and parking are expected to receive power at all times. If one of the 
critical loads does not receive electrical power, the overall system is assumed to be in a failed 
state. Other non-critical loads can be separated by their support buses which are shown in the 
dotted blocks. Note that Fig. 10 is redrawn from an original one-line diagram to aggregate 
various other loads based on their critical or non-critical characteristics, or the busses they feed 
from. The reliability analysis objective in this study is to support the critical loads in Fig. 10. 
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Fig. 10. NYU system one line diagram 
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IV. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS METHODS APPLIED TO THE FIRST CASE: UCONN 
MICRO-GRID  
4.1 RBD Method for Case #1 UConn Micro-grid System Reliability 
The RBDs of the micro-grid shown in Fig. 8 are shown in Fig.11. In Fig.11, λc1, λc2, λc3, are 
the lumped failure rates of power electronic converters and breakers for two PV arrays, FC and 
DG branches, λtr is the failure rate of the transformer and cable. The others are the corresponding 
failure rates of the components in Figs.8 (a)-(c). The MTTFs of the subsystems in the three 
dashed rectangles in Fig.11 (a) are calculated in (4.1)-(4.3), where MTTF1 is the MTTF of the 
two PV array subsystems with PV, DC/DC, DC/AC, and breaker, MTTF2 is the MTTF of the one 
FC subsystem with FC, DC/DC, DC/AC, and breaker, and MTTF3 is the MTTF of the two DG 
subsystems with DG and breaker. Since the structure of the FC and DG subsystems are the same 
with Fig.11 (a), the MTTF in the dashed rectangles in Fig.11s (b) and (c) are not changed. The 
overall system MTTF of Fig. 11 (a) is calculated in (4.4). Equations (4.5) and (4.6) are the 
overall micro-grid system MTTF of Fig.11s (b) and (c). MTTFs in (4.4)-(4.6) are similar since 
the transmission system, the critical load and the PCC have small failure rates compared with the 
distribute generators. But changing the failure rate of these components gives a different result, 
especially the failure rate of the critical load. 
   1 1 12 / 1/ 2 4.8387c pv c pvMTTF years          (4.1) 
 2 21/ 2.020fc cMTTF years      (4.2) 
   3 3 32 / 1/ 2 12.50dgc c dgMTTF years          (4.3) 
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(4.5) 
   3 2 21/ 1/ 1/ ( ) 25.0673load tr load pcc tr loaall d pccMTTF years                  (4.6) 
The MTTF of the one PV subsystem (PV-DC/DC-DC/AC-Breaker series connection) is 
calculated to be 3.2258 years according to Table 3 due to the low assumed reliability of the 
converter and inverter. So it is important to increase their reliability by implementing more 
reliable components or refining converter and inverter configurations based on the RBD 
reliability analysis which is introduced below. The MTTF of the FC subsystem is calculated to be 
2.4393 years and the MTTF of one DG subsystem is 8.3334 years.  
λpv
λpv
 λc1
 λc1
 λfc  λc2
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 λdg
 λtr
 λtr
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 λc3
.
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.
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λload
 
Fig.11 (a). RBD of the micro-grid in Fig.8 (a) where the objective is to support a 3.3kW 
critical load 
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Fig.11 (b). RBD of the micro-grid in Fig.8 (b) where the objective is to support a 150kW 
critical load 
 
Fig.11 (c). RBD of the micro-grid in Fig.8 (c) where the objective is to support a 400kW 
critical load 
4.2 FTA Method for Case #1 UConn Micro-grid System Reliability 
  Before building the fault tree, it is necessary to define the FTA reliability objective. In the 
following case study in this section, the first objective is to support the 3.3 kW critical load, so the 
fault tree of the micro-grid in Fig.8 (a) is shown in Fig.12 (a), with basic events m1 to m21 defined in 
Table 4, intermediate events G1-G11, top event Ttop, in addition to “AND” and “OR” logic gates. 
For the PV system, the power electronics block contains a DC/DC converter, a DC/AC inverter, 
and breaker which are in series with the PV array. Thus, the intermediate event for PV system 
failure G1 has an “OR” gate combining m1, m2, m3, and m4. PV system failure G1 and G2 events are 
in parallel with the FC system failure G3. We assume that the failure of both PV arrays and the FC 
is necessary to achieve a failed subsystem G6. This assumption is to lump clean energy generation 
on one side of the fault tree while diesel generators are used as a back-up. But other objectives can 
be used and may result in other different fault trees which are shown in Fig. 12 (b) with the 
objective of supporting the 150 kW critical load, and in Fig.12 (c) with the objective of supporting 
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the 400kW critical load. 
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Fig.12 (a). Micro-grid fault tree of the first objective of supporting a 3.3kW critical load 
TABLE 4. BASIC EVENTS IN THE MICRO-GRID IN FIG. 12 (A) 
Number Failure Number Failure 
m1 PV panel m12 Start Generator 
m2 DC/DC m13 Breaker 
m3 DC/AC m14 Generator 
m4 Breaker m15 Breaker 
m5 PV panel m16 Generator 
m6 DC/DC m17 Breaker 
m7 DC/AC m18 Transmission 
m8 Breaker m19 Transmission 
m9 Fuel cell m20 PCC 
m10 DC/DC m21 Load 
m11 DC/AC   
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Fig. 12 (b). Micro-grid fault tree of the second objective of supporting a 150kW critical load 
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Fig. 12 (c). Micro-grid fault tree of the third objective of supporting a 400kW critical load 
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4.2.1 Component Importance Coefficient Method 
Without component failure rates, based on equation (2.14), the structure importance values 
of Fig. 12 (a) are calculated as I(1),…, I(23) below. It can be seen that PCC and the critical load 
are the most critical components in the system with the highest importance value. Therefore, the 
best way to improve the system is by improving their dependability. The PCC can also be 
disconnected due to grid-side faults and ensuring that the main grid has less faults that may trip 
the PCC enhances the micro-grid’s reliability to support the critical load. While evaluating the 
components’ importance values can be found and can be a guide to improve the micro-grid’s 
reliability, the lifetime of individual components is not considered in this analysis.   
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The structure importance values of Fig. 12 (b) are calculated as I(9),…, I(23) below. 
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The structure importance values of Fig.12 (c) are calculated below. 
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It is clear from importance value result that large critical loads maintain higher dependence 
on the utility grid where smaller generation becomes less important. 
4.2.2 Monte Carlo Simulation Based Fault Tree (FT-MCS) Method  
In a complex system, applying the traditional FTA becomes more challenging with a large 
number of basic components and logic gates. The MCS method is thus a powerful simulation 
tool to evaluate the reliability of a system by generating random values of uncertain variables 
and scanning the fault tree thousands of times to get a statistic result. While MCS is 
computationally intensive, it can accurately predict fault propagation in a fault tree and thus 
evaluate a system’s reliability.  
MCS uses statistics to mathematically model a system process in real life and estimate its 
reliability. To apply MCS to FTA, the Monte Carlo random sampling is applied in MATLAB 
through a random number Ƞij between 0 and 1 to obtain the failure time of each basic component. 
Assuming F is the failure distribution function of the components, during the j
th
 cycle, the 
occurrence time of event i is tij=F
-1
(ηij). The type of failure distribution function used in the 
simulation is exponential and the failure rates shown in Table 3 are estimated from datasheets of 
actual components and the literature.  
In the j
th
 cycle, the sampling times for all n components (t1j,t2j… tnj) are sorted from the 
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smallest to the largest (tf1,tf2…tfn) and the corresponding basic event order is Z1,Z2…Zn. First, 
only Z1 is set to fail then the top event is tested. If it survives, the simulation should continue 
testing the next basic component Z2 until the top event fails at tfk. This tfk is the time to failure of 
the j
th
 cycle. Another important step is recording the failure times of each component by using 
the time interval method. Tmax is the maximum simulation time, it is divided into intervals and 
the number of times during which the system failed due to each component are recorded during 
each interval. This step can give an importance degree of each component based on the number 
of times it failed. Detailed simulation steps are shown in the FT-MCS algorithm shown below. 
In a fault tree, the “AND” gate structure function should be ( )
b
i
i a
t x

  , since the top 
event after an AND gate is 1 (i.e. ( ) 1t  ) only if all bottom events have occurred (xi=1). The 
“OR” gate structure function should be ( )
d
i
i c
t x

  , since when only one bottom event occurs, 
the top event occurs. Below is the FT-MCS algorithm as applied in MATLAB.  
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FT-MCS Algorithm 
(1) Initialize the maximum simulation time Tmax of the system, simulation interval Δt, 
failure distribution of each component  F1(t),  F2(t),…, Fn(t), state function (0 or 
1) of each component x1(t), x2(t),…, xn(t), simulation cycles W，j=1，top event 
function ;      
(2) While(j≤W); 
(3) Using Monte-Carlo method to obtain the occurrence time samples of each basic 
component t1j, t2j,…,tnj, tij=F
-1
(ηij) here  tij is the failure occurrence time of the i
th
 
basic component. ηij is the random number acquired during the j
th
 sample of event i; 
(4) Sort the failure times in increasing values tf1<tf2<…<tfk<…tfn; 
(5) For k=1 to n; 
(6) If tfk<Tmax; 
(7) x1(tfk)=x2(tfk)=…=xk(tfk)=1, xk+1(tfk)=xk+2(tfk)=…=xn(tfk)=0,，calculate the top event 
; 
(8) If ; 
(9) Record the failure time tfk, the components which lead to system failure, and the 
system failure probability distribution; 
(10) Else k=k+1; 
(11) End if; 
(12) Else  tfk=Tmax, record the failure time  tfk，the components which lead to system 
failure and system failure probability distribution; 
(13) End for; 
(14) Calculate MTTF， system reliability function, and importance of the basic 
components; 
(15) End while; 
Using the MCS method, the PV, FC, and DG subsystems are found to have the reliability 
1 2( ) ( ( ), ( ),..., ( ))nt x t x t x t 
1 2( ) ( ( ), ( ),..., ( ))k fk fk fk n fkt x t x t x t 
( ) 1k fkt 
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distributions shown in Fig. 13. The curves in Fig. 13 clearly show how the system reliability 
changes with time and this eliminates the drawbacks of the traditional fault tree method which is 
static. In Fig. 13 (a), we can see that the reliability of the PV subsystem decreases to being 20% 
reliable after around 5 year operation. Because of the difference of the components’ lifetime, 
different Tmax values in simulations are assumed and are shown as the maximum values on the 
time axes which can be found in Fig. 13. Fig. 14 (a), (b), and (c) show the components’ 
importance degree in each subsystem. From these results we can determine which components 
are the most critical in the subsystems and the overall system. To improve a subsystem’s or 
system’s reliability, the direct way is to improve the reliability of critical components of high 
importance. Fig. 15 gives the overall micro-grid system reliability function and importance 
degree of all the components for the first objective to support a 3.3kW critical load. In 
simulations, the number of iterations W equals to 5000 and based on the components’ failure 
rates used, the system MTTF is found to be 25.683 years. Note that this excludes grid-side faults 
which can be translated into a significantly higher failure rate of the PCC. Fig .16 and Fig.17 are 
the results of the second and third objectives with the MTTFs equal to 25.415 and 25.083 years, 
respectively. Fig.18 shows the comparison of three objectives. 
Using the MCS method, MTTF or failure rate values of an overall micro-grid can be 
approximated as a micro-grid is being designing, and this approximation is based on the 
micro-grid’s component hierarchy. The micro-grid’s subsystems, failure rates, and reliability 
objectives may lead to different final results, but the FTA and FT-MCS can be used for sensitivity 
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analysis and rough reliability models.  
 
Fig.13 (a). PV subsystem reliability function using a combined PV failure rate of 
λpv=35.388x10
-6
 failures/hour 
 
Fig.13 (b). FC subsystem reliability function using a combined FC failure rate of 
λfc=46.798x10
-6
 failures/hour 
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Fig.13 (c). DG subsystem reliability function using a combined DG failure rate of 
λdg=13.699x10
-6
 failures/hour 
 
Fig.14 (a). Component importance of PV subsystem 
 
Fig.14 (b). Component importance of FC subsystem 
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Fig.14 (c). Component importance of DG subsystem 
 
Fig.15 (a). Microgrid system reliability of the first objective to support a 3.3kW critical 
load 
 
Fig.15 (b). Microgrid system impotance degree of components of the first objective to 
support a 3.3 kWcricical load 
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Fig.16 (a). Microgrid system reliability of the second objective to support a 150kW 
critical load 
 
Fig.16 (b). Microgrid system impotance degree of components of the second objective to 
support a 150kW critical load 
 
Fig.17 (a). Microgrid system reliability of the third objective to support a 400kW critical 
load 
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Fig. 17 (b). Microgrid system impotance degree of components of the third objective to 
support a 400 kW critical load 
 
Fig. 18 (a) Micro-grid system reliability of the three objectives 
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Fig. 18 (b) Micro-grid system importance degree of components of the three objectives 
It is clear from the component importance result that higher critical load has lower 
component importance in the micro-grid system. With the lower critical load, micro-grid has 
more distributed generators, so the micro-grid overall system has higher reliability. 
4.2.3 Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis (FFTA) Method   
     As in the theoretical analysis of conventional fault tree method, people treat the event 
occurrence probability or system failure rate as an exact value. However, inaccuracy of the data 
will have effect on the determination of the top event occurrence probability, thus fuzzy numbers 
are also used to describe the probability of events. They do not only overcome the limitation of 
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the failure probability or relationship between events, but also can combine with the engineering 
and technical personnel of practical experience to construct fuzzy membership function [53-55]. 
Fig.19 represents a triangular fuzzy number of event i as an example, and it is defined by a triplet. 
In Fig.19, a1 to a3 is the failure probability range of an event and that has its membership 
function as shown in (4.7). ( )A x is the membership function associated with the fuzzy set.  
                        
1
1
1 2
2 1
3
2 3
3 2
3
0
( )
0
A
x a
x a
a x a
a a
x
a x
a x a
a a
x a

 


  
 
  
 


        
                      (4.7)
 
 If P1’, P2’,…, Pn’ are the possibility functions of n basic events, and PT’ is for the top event, 
then the fuzzy “AND” and “OR” gates are defined in (4.8).  
1 2 1, 2, 3
1 1 1
1 2 1, 2, 3
1
' ( ', ',... ') ( )
' ( ', ',... ') 1 (1 ( ))
n n n
T i i i
i i i
n
T i i i
i
P ANDFUZZY P P Pn a a a
P ORFUZZY P P Pn a a a
  

    
   
 
                                                                          
(4.8) 
 
Fig.19. Membership function of fuzzy number 
Fuzzy number FTA needs to get the practical experience data of the probability. As an 
example of using the fuzzy method, here the approximate fuzzy failure probability values are 
obtained by ranging the failure rates in Table 3 by 20%, which are shown by three fuzzy 
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numbers of each component in Table 5. For example, the MTTF of PV is 25 years (0.04 times 
per year). a1 is 0.032 times per year and a3 is 0.048 times per year by ranging 0.04 by 20%. 
Now the failure probability is a range from 0.032 times per year to 0.048 times per year rather 
than a constant 0.04 times per year. 
The possibility of the occurrence of the top event is calculated by using equation (4.8) based 
on the values in Table 5, which comes out to be (0.016, 0.02, 0.024), shown in Fig.20. This 
means that the maximum possibility of micro-grid failure of objective one in the first case in 
Fig.8 (a) is 2% per year and the failure possibility will lie between 1.6% and 2.4%. Other 
membership functions of fuzzy number may have different results. 
TABLE 5. FUZZY NUMBER FOR FAILURE POSSIBILITY OF BASIC EVENTS 
Component a1 (per year) a2 (per year) a3 (per year) 
PV panel 0.032 0.04 0.048 
DC/DC 0.1 0.125 0.15 
DC/AC 0.1 0.125 0.15 
Breaker 0.016 0.02 0.024 
Fuel cell 0.1 0.125 0.15 
Diesel generator 0.08 0.1 0.12 
Start generator 0.08 0.1 0.12 
Transmission system 0.016 0.02 0.024 
PCC 0.016 0.02 0.024 
Load 0.016 0.02 0.024 
 
Fig.20. Micro-grid top event failure possibility of occurrence with the first objective of 
supporting a 3.3kW critical load 
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4.3 MRM Method for Case #1 UConn Micro-grid System Reliability 
The models in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 are both based on the assumption that the components or 
the systems can be only in two states: a success state or a failed state. In this section, stochastic 
Markov chains are introduced. Markov reliability modeling is also a useful and powerful 
modeling and analysis technique with applications in reliability analysis. The reliability 
characteristics or behavior of a system are represented using a state transition diagram. Using the 
PV subsystem in Fig.21 as an example, and to simplify the example, assume that only one 
component can fail, since the components in a PV branch are in series and failure of one can lead 
to a PV subsystem failure. The Markov model of the PV subsystem is in Fig.22, and the 
probability distribution vector and transition matrix can be obtained as shown in (4.9) and (4.10) 
based on section 2.2.4.  
Table 6 shows all the states and probabilities of the PV subsystem used in the MRM without 
considering recovery. A Markov simulation in MATLAB is used to approximate the predicted 
reliability of the PV system. The MATLB code can be found in Appendix B. The flow chart is 
shown in Fig.23 and ( )P t

 in it can be calculated by the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation in 
(4.11). In this example, X=[1,0,0,0,0] at the starting time, C=[1,0,0,0,0] since the system is 
healthy only at state 0. The results of FT-MCS (blue solid curve) and MRM (red dashed curve) 
are given in Fig.24 (a). Figs.24 (b) and (c) are the FC and DG subsystems reliability functions, 
respectively, using the failure rates in Table 3. This similarity is expected as MCS covers most 
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possible fault occurrences at different random times. Both simulation methods can be easily 
implemented in small size systems with simple logic gate relationships.  
 
Fig.21 PV subsystem example 
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Fig.22 Markov model of PV system 
 00 01 02 03 04( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P t P t P t P t P t P t   (4.9) 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
A
           
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
                                      
 
(4.10) 
( ) ( )P t P t A

   (4.11) 
TABLE 6. PV SERIES SYSTEM STATES AND PROBABILITY OF EACH STATE 
State 
X 
PV panel 
R(1) 
DC/DC 
R(2) 
DC/AC 
R(3) 
Breaker 
R(4) 
System state 
C 
Probability of the state 
P 
0 Success Success Success Success Success R(1)*R(2)*R(3)*R(4) 
1 Failure Success Success Success Failure (1-R(1))*R(2)*R(3)*R(4) 
2 Success Failure Success Success Failure R(1)*(1-R(2))*R(3)*R(4) 
3 Success Success Failure Success Failure R(1)*R(2)*(1-R(3))*R(4) 
4 Success Success Success Failure Failure R(1)*R(2)*R(3)*(1-R(4)) 
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Start
Set simulation maximum time Tmax, iteration J，      
initialize the system states matrix at t=0 
X=[X0,X1...Xn],
system success matrix C=[C0,C1...Cn]    
j=1
G=         *X
X=X+G
Calculate system 
reliability and record it 
Reliability=C*X
j<J
End
Yes
No
( )P t

 
Fig.23 Markov reliability modeling flow chart 
 
Fig.24 (a).MRM VS MCS result of PV system 
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Fig.24 (b). MRM VS MCS result of FC system 
  
Fig.24 (c). MRM VS MCS result of DG system 
For the overall micro-grid system, considering the large number of components in Fig.12 (c), 
take the micro-grid system in Fig.25 as an example here, four components with (2^4) 16 states in 
total are shown in Table 7. The fuel cell system is lumped as a whole component mfc and it is the 
main component in the micro-grid to support a 400kW critical load. When reading the states in 
Table 7, state X0(t) is the initial state where components are operating properly, state X1(t) is 
when mfc fails but the system survives, state X2(t) is when component m18 fails but the system 
survives, state X3(t) is when component m20 fails but the system survives, State X5(t) is when 
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components m18 and mfc fail but the system survives. The final state X15(t) is reached when all 
four components have failed. Based on the last column of Table 7, the reliability of the 
micro-grid system is calculated as shown in (4.12) which reflects the total probability of system 
survival.  
       0 1 2 3 5( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )R t P t P t P t P t P t                     (4.12) 
TABLE 7. COMPONENTS AND SYSTEM STATES OF FIG.24  
State Number mfc state m18 state m20 state m21 state System state 
0 Success Success  Success Success Success 
1 Failure Success Success Success Success 
2 Success Failure Success Success Success 
3 Success Success Failure Success Success 
4 Success Success Success Failure Failure 
5 Failure Failure Success Success Success 
6 Failure Success Failure Success Failure 
7 Failure Success Success Failure Failure 
8 Success Failure Failure Success Failure 
9 Success Failure Success Failure Failure 
10 Success Success Failure  Failure Failure 
11 Failure Failure Failure Success Failure 
12 Failure Failure Success Failure Failure 
13 Failure Success Failure Failure Failure 
14 Success Failure Failure Failure Failure 
15 Failure Failure Failure Failure  Failure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
 
TABLE 8. STATE PROBABILITY VECTORS AND DIFFERENTIALS OF ALL THE VECTORS  
State 
NO State probability vector ( )P t  
Differential equation ( )P t

  
 
0 
0 1 2 3 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P t R t R t R t R t     
'
0 1 2 3 4 0( ) ( ) ( )P t P t         
 
1 
1 1 2 3 4( ) (1 ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )P t R t R t R t R t      
'
1 2 3 4 2 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P t P t P t         
 
2 
2 1 2 3 4( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( ) ( )P t R t R t R t R t      
'
2 1 3 4 3 2 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P t P t P t         
 
3 
3 1 2 3 4( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( )P t R t R t R t R t      
'
3 1 2 4 4 3 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P t P t P t         
 
4 
4 1 2 3 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ( ))P t R t R t R t R t      
'
4 1 2 3 5 4 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P t P t P t         
 
5 
5 1 2 3 4( ) (1 ( )) (1 ( )) ( ) ( )P t R t R t R t R t       
'
5 3 4 6 2 2 1 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P t P t P t P t         
 
6 
6 1 2 3 4( ) (1 ( )) ( ) (1 ( )) ( )P t R t R t R t R t       
'
6 2 4 7 3 2 1 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P t P t P t P t         
 
7 
7 1 2 3 4( ) (1 ( )) ( ) ( ) (1 ( ))P t R t R t R t R t       
'
7 2 3 8 4 2 1 5( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P t P t P t P t         
 
8 
8 1 2 3 4( ) ( ) (1 ( )) (1 ( )) ( )P t R t R t R t R t       
'
8 1 4 9 3 3 2 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P t P t P t P t         
 
9 
9 1 2 3 4( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( ) (1 ( ))P t R t R t R t R t       
'
9 1 3 10 4 3 2 5( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P t P t P t P t         
 
10 
10 1 2 3 4( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ( )) (1 ( ))P t R t R t R t R t       
'
10 1 2 11 4 4 3 5( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P t P t P t P t         
 
11 
11 1 2 3 4( ) (1 ( )) ( ) (1 ( )) ( )P t R t R t R t R t       
'
11 4 12 3 6 2 7 1 9( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P t P t P t P t P t         
 
12 
12 1 2 3 4( ) (1 ( )) (1 ( )) ( ) (1 ( ))P t R t R t R t R t        
'
12 3 13 4 6 2 8 1 10( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P t P t P t P t P t         
 
13 
13 1 2 3 4( ) (1 ( )) ( ) (1 ( )) (1 ( ))P t R t R t R t R t        
'
13 2 14 4 7 3 8 1 11( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P t P t P t P t P t         
 
14 
14 1 2 3 4( ) ( ) (1 ( )) (1 ( )) (1 ( ))P t R t R t R t R t        
'
14 1 15 4 9 3 10 2 11( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P t P t P t P t P t         
 
15 
15 1 2 3 4( ) (1 ( )) (1 ( )) (1 ( )) (1 ( ))P t R t R t R t R t         
'
15 1 15 2 14 3 13 4 12( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )X t P t P t P t P t        
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Fig.25. Equivalent fault tree of Fig.12 (c) for MRM example where the objective is to 
support a 400kW critical load 
The state probability vectors and a set of differential equations associated with the state 
vectors are given by equations in Table 8. Take State 5 as an example, 
31 2 4
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e
P t P t P t
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    
 
 
 
 
 
(4.13) 
 Based on the flow chart in Fig. 23, the reliability of the overall micro-grid system can be 
obtained by integrating the differential equations. 
Since there are 21 components in Fig. 12 (a), the total states of the system will be 2^21, 
considering the large number of components in Fig.12 (a), the subsystems G6, and G7 are set as 
two new components in the overall system MRM simulation in the dashed block in Fig.26 (a). 
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The equivalent failure rates of all components are shown in Table 9. The curves in Fig.27 (a) 
give the reliability functions of the overall micro-grid system for the first objective of supporting 
a 3.3kW critical load (FT-MCS (blue curve), MRM (red curve), and RBD (green curve)).  
To simplify the calculation, Fig.26 (b) is the equivalent FT of Fig.12 (b) with the equivalent 
failure rates shown in Table 10. Fig. 27 (b) is the FT-MCS (blue curve), MRM (red curve) and 
RBD (green curve) comparison results for the second reliability objective of supporting a 150kW 
critical load. Fig 25 is the equivalent FT of Fig.12 (c) and Fig. 27 (c) is the FT-MCS (blue curve), 
MRM (red curve) and RBD (green curve) comparison results. 
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Fig. 26 (a). Equivalent fault tree of Fig.12 (a) 
TABLE 9. EQUIVALENT FAILURE RATES USED IN MRM OF FIG.12 (A) 
Component 
 
Failure rate 
(failures/hour) 
Component Failure rate 
(failures/hour) 
m18 2.2831x10
-6
 m20 2.2831 x10
-6 
G6 
( renewable energy 
branch combined) 
21.0114 x10
-6
 G7 
(DG systems 
combined) 
9.0800 x10
-6
 
m19 2.2831 x10
-6
 m21 2.2831 x10
-6
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Fig. 26 (b). Equivalent fault tree of Fig.12 (b) 
TABLE 10. EQUIVALENT FAILURE RATES USED IN MRM OF FIG.12 (B) 
Component 
 
Failure rate 
(failures/hour) 
Component Failure rate 
(failures/hour) 
G3 
( renewable 
energy branch 
combined) 
56.512 x10
-6
 G5 
( one DG system 
combined) 
13.6992 x10
-6
 
m18 2.2831 x10
-6
 m20 2.2831 x10
-6
 
m19 2.2831 x10
-6
 m21 2.2831 x10
-6
 
G4 
(one DG system 
combined) 
13.6992 x10
-6
 
  
 
TABLE 11. EQUIVALENT FAILURE RATES USED IN MRM OF FIG.12 (C) 
Component 
 
Failure rate 
(failures/hour) 
Component Failure rate 
(failures/hour) 
m18 2.2831 x10
-6
 m20 2.2831 x10
-6
 
mfc 56.512 x10
-6
 m21 2.2831 x10
-6
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Fig.27 (a). RBD,MRM, and MCS result of overall micro-grid system with the first objective of 
supporting a 3.3kWcritical load  
 
Fig.27 (b). RBD, MRM, and MCS result of overall micro-grid system with the second objective 
of supporting a 150kW critical load 
 
Fig.27 (c). RBD, MRM, and MCS result of overall micro-grid system with the third objective of 
supporting a 150kW critical  
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In this Chapter, micro-grid at UConn with three reliability objectives is studied. The MTTFs 
of three objectives are similar since the critical load, the transmission system and the PCC have 
small failure rates compared to the other components. But the slight difference between MTTFs 
also can illustrate the system reliability characteristic, micro-grid of the first objective of 
supporting a 3.3kW critical load has larger MTTF since it has more parallel distributed 
generation resources. When doing the reliability analysis and modeling, the objective changes, 
the result will be changed. Changing the failure rate of the components in a real system will give 
a huge different result, especially the failure rate of the component with large importance. The 
detail comparison of the MTTFs can be found in Chapter VII. 
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V. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS METHODS APPLICATION ON THE SECOND AND THIRD CASE 
STUDIES: KING’S PLAZA AND NEW YORK UNIVERSITY  
5.1 Reliability Analysis of Case Study #2 King’s Plaza Micro-grid System 
The one-line diagram of Fig.9 was transformed into an RBD as shown in Fig. 28. Two 
feeders coming from Con-Edison with Gridlink converters, and gas engines are in parallel 
supporting the King’s Plaza Mall. In each feeder, all the devices are in series. If Con-Edison 
fails, the generators can support the King’s Plaza Mall. In RBD analysis, it is assumed that 
Con-Edison fails twice per year, and all the other failure rates are found using average lifetime 
information found in the literature. The failure rates shown in Table 12 are estimated from the 
literature [56-69] for this case. Another assumption is that all switchgear have the same failure 
rate sg and all transformers have the same failure rate tr, lo is the failure rate of the load itself 
irrespective of the rest of the rest of the micro-grid system, i.e. the inability of a load to receive 
power due to an internal load fault even though power is available from the micro-grid. 
TABLE 12. FAILURE RATES OF COMPONENTS AS APPROXIMATED FROM THE LITERATURE IN CASE 
TWO AND THREE [56-69] 
Device 
Failure rate 
(failures/hour) 
Device 
Failure  rate 
(failures/hour) 
Switchgear (SG unit) sg =4.5662 x10
-6
 Converter 
dc/ac =ac/dc 
=14.2692 x10
-6
 
Transformer tr =4.5662 x10
-6
 Gas Turbine gt =11.4155 x10
-6
 
Fuse fu =2.5368 x10
-6
 Con-Edison co =228.32 x10
-6
 
Diesel generator dg=11.4155 x10
-6
 Loads (Mall) lo =456.64 x10
-6
 
Filter fi=14.2692 x10
-6
 Bus/bus bus =2.8539 x10
-6
 
Gridlink gl=14.2692 x10
-6
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Kings Plaza fails a few times per year, now due to the engines not being able to follow load 
changes, or a trip of a generator, which similarly causes large load swings. It is envisioned that 
the Gridlink system will eliminate this by using power from Con-Edison for very short load 
balancing requirements. So here we have following four detail case for Kings’ Plaza system 
reliability study.  
A. King’s Plaza system with the critical load (lo =4/8760 failures/hour) 
 As shown below,  1,KP,  2,KP,  3,KP are the failure rates of the three top and parallel block 
groups in dashed lines yielding MTTF1,KP, MTTF2,KP , MTTF3,KP, respectively and MTTFall,KP for 
the whole system. 
 Since the King’s Plaza Mall itself is assumed to fail four times per year in this case, the 
total system MTTF is quite small since the Mall itself has the largest importance in all the 
components. Note that these MTTF values are approximated using the RBD shown in Fig.28 and 
may not reflect actual values, mainly due to the approximate failure rate values used.  
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Switchgear unit 7 Transformer 4 Switchgear unit 8 Fuse 4 Gas
Fig.28 RBD of KP micro-grid system with the critical load and Gridlink 
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Fig.29 is the fault tree of the KP system with the objective of supporting the King’s Plaza 
mall at 2MW and lo =4/8760 failures/hour. The component importance and system reliability 
function can be found in Fig.38 using FT-MCS method. In the FT-MCS, simulation iteration 
equals to 5000, the MTTF is found to be 0.2456 years. The MRM result is shown in Fig.30 in red 
curve compared with the FT-MCS result in blue curve and RBD result in green curve. In the 
MRM, simulation iteration also equals to 5000, the MTTF is found to be 0.2389 years. 
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Fig. 29 Fault tree of KP micro-grid system with an objective to support the 2MW load 
 
Fig.30 RBD, MRM, and MCS results of the King’s Plaza system reliability with critical load 
 (lo =4/8760 failures/hour) 
B. King’s Plaza system with the critical load (lo =0.2/8760 failures/hour) 
   When the failure rate of the mall is once per five years (lo =0.2/8760 failures/hour), RBD 
and fault tree of the system are not changed. The MTTF of the overall King’s Plaza system is 
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calculated as  
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  The MRM result is shown in Fig.31 in red curve compared with the FT-MCS result in 
blue curve, and RBD result in green curve and FT-MCS results can be found in Fig.38. In the 
FT-MCS, simulation iteration equals to 5000, the MTTF is found to be 2.0865 years. In the 
MRM, simulation iteration also equals to 5000, the MTTF is found to be 2.0779 years. 
 
Fig.31 RBD, MRM, and MCS result of the King’s Plaza system reliability with critical load  
(lo =0.2/8760) 
C. King’s Plaza system with ideal critical load (load never fails) 
When there is an ideal load (Mall) in the King’s Plaza system, RBD and fault tree of the 
system are shown in Fig. 32 and Fig. 33. The MTTF of the overall system is calculated as  
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Fig.32. RBD of the King’s Plaza system with ideal critical load 
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Fig.33 Fault tree of the King’s Plaza system with ideal critical load 
The component importance and system reliability function are shown in Fig.38 using 
FT-MCS method. In the FT-MCS, simulation iteration equals to 5000, the MTTF is found to be 
5.4688 years. The MRM result is shown in Fig.34 in red curve compared with the FT-MCS result 
in blue curve and RBD result in green curve. In the MRM, simulation iteration also equals to 
5000, the MTTF is found to be 5.3276 years. 
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Fig.34 RBD, MRM, and MCS result of the King’s Plaza system reliability with ideal critical load 
D. King’s Plaza system without Gridlink converters but with the critical load (lo=4/8760 
failures/hour) 
 When this is no Gridlink in the system, the micro-grid is synchronous connection, RBD 
and fault tree of the system are shown in Fig.35 and Fig. 36.  1,KP,  2,KP,  3,KP are the failure 
rates of the three top and parallel block groups in dashed lines yielding MTTF1,KP, MTTF2,KP , 
MTTF3,KP, respectively and MTTFall,KP for the whole system are calculated below. 
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Fig.35 RBD of the King’s Plaza system without Gridlink 
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Fig.36 Fault tree of the King’s Plaza system without Gridlink 
The comparison of the component importance and system reliability function of four 
situations are shown in Fig.38 using FT-MCS method. In the FT-MCS, simulation iteration 
equals to 5000, the MTTF is found to be 0.2488 years. The MRM result is shown in Fig.37 in red 
curve compared with the FT-MCS result in blue curve and RBD result in green curve. In the 
MRM, simulation iteration also equals to 5000, the MTTF is found to be 0.2393 years.     
71 
 
       
Fig.37 RBD, MRM, and MCS result of the King’s Plaza system reliability without Gridlink 
 
Fig.38 (a) King’s Plaza micro-grid reliability comparison (lo =4/8760 failures/hour, lo 
=0.2/8760 failures/hour, ideal load, and no gridlink) 
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Fig.38 (b) Importance degree of the basic components in King’s Plaza system (lo =4/8760 
failures/hour, lo =0.2/8760 failures/hour, ideal load and no gridlink) 
5.2 Reliability Analysis of Case Study #3 New York University Micro-grid System 
The simplified RBDs of the critical loads in the NYU micro-grid, which mainly considers 
supporting the critical loads, are shown in Fig. 39. It’s learned from the one line diagram in Fig.10 
(a) that transformers 1 and 2 support Bus C, so if one of the transformers fails, it will not affect the 
Bus C sub-system. Silver Tower Garage, Broadway Block Substation NO.3 and Central Heating 
Plant have their own bus sub-systems as shown in Fig. 39. Substation NO.3 and Silver Tower 
Garage have the same RBD. The MTTFs in Fig.39 are calculated below, MTTF1 MTTF2, and 
MTTF3, are the results with the failure rates of the critical loads equal to 4/8760, 1/8760, or 
0.1/8760 failures/hour to study the impact of load failure rate on the system reliability. Assuming 
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all the transformers have the same failure rate tr, buses have failure rate bus, and the failure rate of 
the critical loads lo in all RBDs. 1 is the failure rate of the dotted block in Fig.39 (c). The other 
components’ failure rates are estimated from the literature and some industry norms as shown in 
Table 12. 
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Fig.39 (a).Substation NO.3 RBD 
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Fig.39 (b). Silver Tower Garage RBD 
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Fig.39 (c). Central heating plant RBD 
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The fault trees in Fig.40 have the same objectives to supporting three critical loads silver 
tower garage, substation NO.3 and central heating plant in Fig.39. Since the Silver Tower Garage 
and Substation NO.3 have the same one-line diagram, their fault trees are the same and the 
reliability modeling analysis result has no differences. Here only the result of the Silver Tower 
Garage is shown.  
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Fig. 40 (a). Silver tower garage fault tree Fig. 40 (b). Substation NO.3 fault tree 
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Fig. 40 (c). Central heating plant fault tree 
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The FT-MCS results of the silver tower garage (critical load) system reliability with the 
failure rate of the critical load at 4/8760, 1/8760, and 0.1/8760 failures/hour are shown in Fig.41 
and the importance of the components are shown in Fig.42. We can see that the garage is the 
most important component under all these three situations since it is in series with all the other 
devices. This implies that the garage load should be very reliable itself. With the increase of the 
reliability of the load, its importance decreases, as shown in Fig.42. The different failure rates of 
the same component will result in a different component importance of all the components. The 
MTTFs of the systems in Fig.41 are 0.2496 years, 0.9171 years, and 5.0028 years in the MCS 
simulation. The MRM simulation results can be found in Fig.43 in red curves compared with the 
RBD results in green curve and MCS results in blue curves. The MTTFs in MRM are 0.2459 
years, 0.9110 years, and 4.9810 years. 
 
Fig. 41. Silver Tower Garage reliability (lo=4/8760 failures/hour, lo=1/8760 failures/hour, 
and lo=0.1/8760 failures/hour) 
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Fig. 42. Silver Tower Garage system component importance (lo=4/8760 failures/hour, 
lo=1/8760 failures/hour, and lo=0.1/8760 failures/hour) 
 
Fig. 43 (a). RBD, MCS, and MRM result comparison of Silver Tower Garage reliability 
 (lo=4/8760 failures/hour) 
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Fig. 43 (b). RBD, MCS, and MRM result comparison of Silver Tower Garage reliability 
 (lo=1/8760 failures/hour) 
 
Fig. 43 (c). RBD, MCS, and MRM result comparison of Silver Tower Garage reliability 
 (lo=0.1/8760 failures/hour) 
Since the failure rate of the central heating plant is also difficult to obtain, here in the 
simulation, three failure rates (4/8760, 1/8760, and 0.1/8760 failures/hour) are assumed. The 
simulation results of the central heating plant system are shown below. Fig.44 and Fig.45 are the 
results of the FT-MCS and the comparisons between RBD (green curve), MCS (blue curves) and 
MRM (red curves) are shown in Fig.46. MTTFs of the systems in Fig.44 are 0.2610 years, 
0.9600 years, and 5.1000 years in the FT-MCS simulation. The MTTFs in MRM are 0.2500 
years, 0.9243 years, and 5.0290 years. 
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Fig. 44. Central heating plant reliability (lo=4/8760 failures/hour, lo=1/8760 failures/hour, 
lo=0.1/8760 failures/hour) 
 
Fig. 45 . Central heating plant system component importance (lo=4/8760 failures/hour, 
lo=1/8760 failures/hour, lo=0.1/8760 failures/hour) 
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Fig. 46 (a). RBD, MCS, and MRM result comparison of Central Heating Plant reliability 
 (lo=4/8760 failures/hour) 
 
Fig. 46 (b). RBD, MCS, and MRM result comparison of Central Heating Plant reliability 
 (lo=1/8760 failures/hour) 
  
Fig. 46 (c). RBD, MCS, and MRM result comparison of Central Heating Plant reliability 
(lo=0.1/8760 failures/hour) 
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In this chapter, two micro-grid systems are studied. King’s Plaza micro-grid with four cases 
and NYU micro-grid with variable loads are discussed. In both micro-grid systems, the critical 
loads under study play a very important role in the overall systems. Figs. 38 (a), 41, and 44 
clearly show the different system reliabilities with different failure rates of the loads. Comparing 
the first case to the forth case in King’s Plaza system study, the MTTFs with and without 
Gridlink are similar after calculation and simulation using three methods. Therefore, if there is a 
series of Gridlink inverters added into system and other performance of the overall King’s Plaza 
system can be improved in terms of fault ride through and non-synchronous interconnection, 
then the little decrease of the MTTF is not a significant issue. Detailed comparison of the MTTFs 
can be found in Chapter VII. 
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VI. DESIGN FOR RELIABILITY  
6.1 RBD Method for PV Micro-grid System Reliability Design 
With several reliability modeling and analysis methods introduced in Chapter III, and 
applied to micro-grids in Chapters IV and V, it is now possible to utilize such methods to close 
the micro-grid design loop. This will achieve a design-for-reliability approach. RBD is chosen as 
the method to be used due to its simplicity, but other methods can follow a similar 
design-for-reliability approach.  
Photovoltaic (PV) panels which are fundamental components in PV systems and 
micro-grids are reliable and have a long performance period of around 20-25 years. But, power 
electronic converters are fundamental components in PV energy conversion and have shorter 
expected lifetimes. Thus, studying the effect of power electronics on solar PV system reliability 
is of interest.  
The proposed PV system design for reliability method is illustrated in Fig. 47. The process 
starts with multiple electrical system configurations in terms of DC/DC and DC/AC conversion 
stages distributed across the system. Then, an RBD is established for each configuration. An 
arbitrary failure rate is assigned to each converter in the configuration where the failure rate is of 
an unknown value, then a reliability function is symbolically derived. However, failure rates 
used are not completely arbitrary as a meaningful range of each failure rate is determined from 
literature search. Sensitivity analysis of the reliability function’s MTTF is performed by 
sweeping over this range for each arbitrary failure rate. The MTTF of each configuration is thus 
plotted against converters’ failure rate variations to extract desired converters’ failure rates that 
yield a target system-level MTTF. Thus, if the desired system MTTF is known, converters and 
their components can be selected to meet this MTTF.  
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Fig.47. Description of the steps taken to evaluate the reliability of various system configurations 
Several PV system configurations are shown in Fig.48. All the modules with a centralized 
converter or inverter are connected in both series Fig.48 (a,1) and parallel Fig.48 (a,2) 
configurations. The series configuration is widely used because of its low cost and ability to 
produce a higher DC bus voltage. 
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Fig. 48 Different electrical configurations of PV panel: (a,1) Series connection with central 
inverter, (a,2) Parallel connection with central inverter, (b).Panel with micro-converter and 
micro-inverter, (c) Panel with single-stage micro- inverter, e.g. boost inverter 
However, micro-converter [70] (Fig. 48(b)) and micro-inverter [71] (Fig. 48 (c)) topologies have 
been proposed as alternatives due to their ability to extract more PV energy. The converters are 
usually similar in (a) and (b) except for the different power levels and thus failure rates. 
For the PV panels in series and parallel configurations shown in Figs. 48(a,1) and (a,2) with 
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a central inverter, the RBD should be the same even though their electrical systems are different. 
Fig. 49 (a) shows the RBD of Figs. 48 (a,1) and (a,2). With appropriate protection systems, these 
configurations maintain operation even if one DC/DC stage fails. The RBD of the systems with 
two-stage micro-inverters shown in Fig. 48 (b) and single-stage micro-inverters shown in Fig. 48 
(c) are shown in Figs. 49 (b) and (c), respectively. Assuming that the components are 
non-repairable, DC/DC and micro-converter failure rates are assumed to be λ2, the centralized 
inverter failure rate as λ1, the micro-inverter failure rate in Fig.49 (b) as λ3, and the micro-inverter 
failure rate in Fig. 49(c) as λ4. Micro-inverter2 is more complex than micro-inverter1 since the 
former includes a single-stage, e.g. boost inverter [72], and therefore they have different failure 
rates. 
 
Fig.49 (a) RBD with centralized inverter 
 (b) RBD with two-stage micro-inverter (micro-converter and micro-inverter)  
(c) RBD with single-stage micro-inverter 
By implementing equations (2.8)-(2.11) to the RBDs in Figs. 49 (a)-(c), MTTF estimates for 
each RBD can be analytically found as shown in equations (6.1)-(6.3). The Gamma function (Γ) 
is defined as Γ(n)=(n-1)!. Assuming n DC/DC converters, n micro-converters, and n 
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micro-inverters are in Fig.48. MTTFa, MTTFb, and MTTFc are the MTTFs of the systems in 
Fig.49 (a)-(c), respectively. 
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 Numerical MTTF values can then be determined by implementing equations (6.1)-(6.3) in 
MATLAB for given values of λ1, ..., λ4. Theoretically, if a PV panel has a lifetime of 20-30 years, 
the converter and the inverter systems should also have a 20-30 year lifetime in order to maintain 
the system reliability, but this is not the case in real systems. Since values of λ1, ..., λ4 are difficult 
to determine in an accurate manner, ranges for these failure rates are used to evaluate the MTTF 
of each configuration. Based on the literature review of the failure rates for different converters, 
a thorough review of MTTFs and failure rates of the converters is presented in Table 13, which 
can be used as a reference to choose the suitable converters, more details of the converters can be 
found in [73-83]. Since some of the failure rates in the table are too small to affect the system 
MTTF, or too large to dominate the system’s reliability, failure rates in the range of 2.5-25e-6 
failures/hour are considered here. 
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TABLE 13. EXAMPLE CONVERTER TYPES AND MTTFS [73-83] 
Type MTTF 
(year) 
Failure rate 
(failures/hour 
10
-6
) 
Type MTTF 
(year) 
Failure rate 
(failures/hour 
10
-6
) 
Rectifier/inverter 
 
3.67-4.3 26.6-31.09 IBH 
converter 
2.03-14.27 8-56.23 
Intermediate bus 
converter  
1.16-9.51 12-98 Inverter 
  
9.71 11.75 
Boost converter  6.93 16.4718 Boost 
inverter 
4.07-16.3 7-28 
DC/DC  
converter  
 
9.92-17.84 
14.38-24.82 
6.4-11.5 
(MOSFET 
based) 
4.6-7.94 
(IGBT 
based) 
DC/AC 
converter  
 
6.52-11.41 
10.99-17.84 
10-17.5 
(MOSFET 
based) 
6.4-10.38 
(IGBT based) 
Buck converter  25.41-26.11 4.372-4.494 Fly-back 
inverter  
20.47 5.577 
Back-to-back 
converter  
3.68 31 Matrix 
converter  
3.98 28.66 
F3E-based PV 
inverters  
11.4155 10    
By sweeping over ranges of λ1, ..., λ4, Fig.50 shows plots of MTTFa, MTTFb, and MTTFc. To 
demonstrate how these MTTFs are used, a system-level MTTF between 20 and 30 years is used 
as an example with n=10, which leads to specific ranges for λ1, ..., λ4 highlighted in yellow in 
Figs. 50 (d)-(f). For example, Fig. 50 (e) shows that λ2 and λ3 should be between 0.9 and 1.5 x 
10
-6 
failures per hour to achieve a desired system-level MTTF between 20 and 30 years. 
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(a) (d) 
 
 
(b) (e) 
  
(c) (f) 
Fig.50 Variation of (a) MTTFa, (b) MTTFb, and (c) MTTFc 3D plots, and 2D plots (d), (e), 
and (f), respectively at n=10 
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(a) (d) 
 
 
(b) (e) 
 
 
(c) (f) 
Fig.51 Variation of (a) MTTFa, (b) MTTFb, and (c) MTTFc 3D plots, and 2D plots (d), (e), and 
(f), respectively at various n with an assumption that λ1= λ2= λ3. 
The effect of different number of panels is studied by varying n. For simpler visualization, λ1, 
λ2, and λ3 are all assumed equal. Results for varying n are shown in Fig. 51. Note that as n 
increases, all configurations are shown to tolerate higher failure rates as expected due to 
redundant PV panels being available in the system. Note that for configurations in Figs. 48 (b) 
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and (c), the number of converters also increases with the number of panels and thus converters 
need to be more reliable with small values of n to ensure a 20-30 year system MTTF is achieved. 
Note that the failure rate ranges and choice of specific system MTTF ranges are shown for 
illustrative purposes to demonstrate the proposed methodology. 
The proposed design-for-reliability approach for PV systems based on the results in Figs. 50 
and 51 can thus be summarized as shown in the dotted box of Fig.52. Future work can address 
other portions of this proposed approach 
Determine
 λ1min,λ1max
λ2min,λ2max
λ1min≤ λ1≤ λ1max
λ2min≤ λ2≤ λ2max
Upgrade PV topology 
with new converters 
then generate new 
reliability model
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Fig.52. PV system design for reliability approach 
 
This Chapter presents an RBD-based approach to evaluate PV system reliability for various 
configurations to aid in the design-for-reliability of power electronics. The proper number and 
type of converters, inverters, and PV panels are determined based on a desired system MTTF, 
and desired converter failure rates are extracted. The proposed system-level design procedure is 
explained through three main PV system configurations for which MTTFs are evaluated for a 
range of converter failure rates. Tighter failure rate ranges are then extracted for desired MTTFs 
for each system, and are expected to be used with power electronic converter design and 
selection. The proposed approach is expected to be scalable to larger systems, adjustable to 
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various PV system configurations, and applicable to other energy systems where the reliability of 
power electronics is a design criterion. 
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VII. DISCUSSION AND COMPARISON 
The MTTF results from the three reliability modeling and analysis methods for three cases 
with different reliability objectives show how each method can be applied to micro-grid 
reliability evaluation. The MTTFs calculated using the RBD method are approximately equal to 
the results in the MCS and MRM, as shown in Tables 14-17. The MTTFs in Table 14 are similar 
since the failure rate of the critical load is not changed. The only change is the equivalent failure 
rates of the distributed generation resources which has small importance compared to the critical 
load. In Tables 15-17, the MTTFs are different because of the variable failure rates of the loads. 
 However, FTA on its own does not consider components’ failure rates and considers the 
structure importance rates which differ with the reliability objective defined.  
Based on applying these three different methods to example micro-grid case studies, 
comparisons can be drawn as summarized in Tables 18 and 19. 
TABLE 14. THE COMPARISON OF THREE METHODS OF THREE OBJECTIVES FOR CASE STUDY #1 
UCONN MICRO-GRID 
Methods MTTF (years) 
First objective Second objective Third objective 
RBD 25.466 25.213 25.067 
FTA-MCS 25.683 25.415 25.083 
MRM 26.236 26.060 25.830 
 
TABLE 15 MTTF COMPARISON OF CASE STUDY #2 KING’S PLAZA MALL 
Method   MTTF(year) 
load=1/0.25 year load=1/5 year Ideal load No Gridlink 
RBD 0.2312 1.9947 5.3134 0.2364 
FTA-MC 0.2456 2.0865 5.4688 0.2488 
MRM 0.2389 2.0779 5.3676 0.2393 
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TABLE 16 MTTF COMPARISON OF CASE STUDY #3 NYU (SILVER TOWER GARAGE) 
Method   MTTF(year) 
load=0.25 year λload=1 year λload=10 year 
RBD 0.2466 0.9195 5.0208 
FTA-MC 0.2496 0.9171 5.0028 
MRM 0.2459 0.9110 4.9810 
TABLE 17 MTTF COMPARISON OF CASE STUDY #3 NYU (CENTRAL HEATING PLANT) 
Method MTTF(year) 
load=0.25 year λload=1 year λload=10 year 
RBD 0.2570 0.9400 5.0610 
FTA-MC 0.2610 0.9600 5.1000 
MRM 0.2500 0.9234 5.0290 
TABLE 18. THE COMPARISON OF THREE METHODS 
Characteristics RBD FTA FTA-MCS MRM 
Static: the diagram changes without time o o   
Dynamic: the diagram changes with time   o o 
Logic based: depends on the “AND” and 
”OR” relationship between the failures 
o o o  
State based: depends on the system states 
when the faults happen. 
   o 
Top-down: depends on system hierarchy o o o  
TABLE 19. SUMMARY OF ADVANTAGES (A) AND DISADVANTAGES (D) OF THE THREE METHODS 
Method Advantages Disadvantages 
RBD A1: Easy to build simple logic 
diagrams 
A2: Can evaluate system reliability 
(R(t), MTTF) 
D1: Some complex structures and 
component sharing cannot be clearly 
represented.  
D2: Formulations of MTTF can 
become very complicated 
FTA A1: Easy to build for simple systems 
with a small number of failures 
A2: Can show multiple failures or 
combinations of failures 
A3: Quickly exposes critical cut sets 
that lead to system failure 
D1: Time consuming to build for 
larger systems 
D2: Requires detailed knowledge of 
the design, construction and operation 
of the system 
D3: Cannot account for failure rates 
or repair rates are state-dependent 
MRM A1: Sequential system  states and 
fault propagation can be accounted for 
A2: Captures fault coverage rates and 
state-dependent failure rates 
D1: Incredibly large number of states 
for complex systems 
D2:Hard to get accurate failure rates 
for state transitions 
93 
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS  
This thesis provides an overview of the fault universe of major components in a micro-grid 
and how these failures can affect the reliability of a micro-grid. In the thesis, three reliability 
analysis approaches RBD, FTA, and MRM used to evaluate the micro-grid system reliability are 
analyzed and compared. Focus is given to physical system failure. Reliability analysis of three 
case studies is shown using the three different methods: RBD, FTA, and MRM. The MTTF of 
various micro-grids with different reliability objectives and loads are calculated using the 
estimated failure rates. The FT-MCS and MRM methods are implemented in software such as 
MTALAB to get the reliability functions of the each micro-grid case. Results show sample 
reliability models of the micro-grid for a reliability objective being to support a critical load, but 
other objectives such as full operation in islanding mode can be used to generate different 
reliability models and other distributions of the component failure function will lead to different 
result. Results illustrate that all methods provide similar MTTF approximation but will with 
different approaches. The effect of critical load reliability is also studied. A design-for-reliability 
approach is proposed to get higher standards for micro-grid power electronics reliability through 
a close loop iterative design process. 
These reliability modeling methods can also be applied to other larger power and energy 
systems for lifetime estimation and to enhance the system’s reliability at the design stage.  
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Appendix B: Matlab Code 
1. MCS for the first objective of supporting a 3.3kW critical load of UConn micro-grid: 
function MonteCarlo3p3KW() 
clc; 
lambda=[4.5662,14.269,14.269,2.2831,  4.5662,14.269,14.269,2.2831,  
14.269,14.269,14.269,11.416, 2.2831,   11.416,2.2831,11.416,2.2831,  2.2831, 
2.2831,2.2831,2.2831].*0.000001; 
name={'PV','DC/DC','DC/AC','Breaker', 'PV','DC/DC','DC/AC','Breaker',  
'FC','DC/DC','DC/AC','Start Generator','Breaker', 'DG','Breaker','DG','Breaker', 
'Transmission','Transmission','PCC','Load'}; 
[m,n]=size(lambda); 
T_max=150*8760;     
inter_t=200;   
t=zeros(1,n);    
N=5000;      
mm=T_max/inter_t;    
fs=zeros(1,mm);    
Rs=zeros(1,mm);     
Ps=zeros(1,mm);     
delta_m=zeros(1,mm);  
component_m=zeros(1,n);  
component_w=zeros(1,n);  
  
for j=1:N 
    component=zeros(1,n);    
    t=time(lambda,n); 
    [t_f,index]=sort(t);   
    for k=1:n 
        if(t_f(k))>=T_max 
         delta_m(end)=delta_m(end)+1;  
         break; 
        end 
        component(index(k))=1;  
        top_event=top_function(component);   
        if top_event ~= 0 
           if mod(t_f(k),inter_t)==0 
               delta_m(fix(t_f(k)/inter_t))=delta_m(fix(t_f(k)/inter_t))+1;   
           else delta_m(fix(t_f(k)/inter_t)+1)=delta_m(fix(t_f(k)/inter_t)+1)+1;  
           end 
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           component_m(index(k))=component_m(index(k))+1; 
           break; 
        end 
    end 
     
end 
fs=cumulativefailure(delta_m,mm); 
fs_m=zeros(1,mm+1); 
fs_m(2:end)=fs; 
Rs=1.-fs; 
Rs_m=ones(1,mm+1); 
Rs_m(2:end)=Rs; 
Ps=failureprobability(delta_m,mm); 
component_w=componentweight(component_m,n); 
name_s={'PV','DC/DC','DC/AC','Breaker','FC','Load','DG','Transmission','   
PCC','   Start Generator'}; 
component_s=zeros(1,10); 
component_s(1)=component_w(1)+component_w(5); 
component_s(2)=component_w(2)+component_w(6)+component_w(10); 
component_s(3)=component_w(3)+component_w(7)+component_w(11); 
component_s(4)=component_w(4)+component_w(8)+component_w(13)+component_w(15)+
component_w(17); 
component_s(5)=component_w(9); 
component_s(6)=component_w(21); 
component_s(7)=component_w(14)+component_w(16); 
component_s(8)=component_w(18)+component_w(19); 
component_s(9)=component_w(20); 
component_s(10)=component_w(12); 
 
figure(2); 
hold on; 
plot(0:inter_t:T_max,Rs_m); 
title('System reliability'); 
hold off; 
figure; 
bar(component_s,0.5); 
set(gca, 'XTickLabel', name_s); 
title('Importance degree of the basic components');%display(component_w); 
MTTF=mean_life(Ps,inter_t,T_max); 
display(MTTF); 
end 
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 function t=time(lambda,n) 
monte_random=rand(1,n); 
t=-log(monte_random)./lambda; 
end 
  
 function fs=cumulativefailure(delta_m,mm) 
fs=zeros(1,mm); 
mr=0; 
total=sum(delta_m); 
for w=1:mm 
    mr=mr+delta_m(w); 
    fs(w)=mr/total; 
end 
end 
  
 function Ps=failureprobability(delta_m,mm) 
Ps=zeros(1,mm); 
total=sum(delta_m); 
for w=1:mm 
    Ps(w)=delta_m(w)/total; 
end 
end 
  
 function component_w=componentweight(component_m,n) 
component_w=zeros(1,n); 
total=sum(component_m); 
component_w=component_m./total; 
end 
  
 function MTTF=mean_life(Ps,inter_t,T_max) 
t=inter_t:inter_t:T_max; 
MTTF=sum(Ps.*t); 
end 
  
function top_system=top_function(component) 
PV_system_1=sum(component(1,1:4)); 
PV_system_2=sum(component(1,5:8)); 
FC_system=sum(component(1,9:13)); 
DG_system_1=component(14)+component(15); 
DG_system_2=component(16)+component(17); 
103 
 
sub_1=PV_system_1*PV_system_2*FC_system; 
sub_2=DG_system_1*DG_system_2; 
sub_3=component(18)+sub_1; 
sub_4=component(19)+sub_2; 
sub_5=sub_3*sub_4; 
sub_6=sub_5*component(20); 
top_system=component(21)+sub_6; 
end 
 
2. MRM for the first objective of supporting a 3.3kW critical load of UConn micro-grid: 
%================================================================ 
% BY: xiaofang shi 
% mircogrid overall system markov 150KW 6states 
%================================================================ 
clear; 
time = 150; % TIME (Years) 
lambda_all=[0.02,1/5.2,0.02,1/12.50,0.02,0.02]; 
%R_trans=0.02; 
%R_load=0.02; 
%R_pcc=0.02; 
%_______________________________________ 
format long 
%================================================================ 
%  Initialized Variable 
%================================================================ 
lambda_all1=lambda_all(1); % Scale 
lambda_all2=lambda_all(2); % Scale 
lambda_all3=lambda_all(3); % Scale 
lambda_all4=lambda_all(4); % Scale 
lambda_all5=lambda_all(5); % Scale 
lambda_all6=lambda_all(6); % Scale 
  
Divisions = 5000; % Simulation Iterations 
dt = time/Divisions % Delta Time Per Iteration 
%Rel_PV=zeros(1,Divisions); 
%================================================================ 
% USING MARKOV____________ 
%================================================================ 
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X=[1;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;
0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0];%Initial values of the 
states 
C = 
[1,0,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,
1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]; 
%________________________________________ 
t = dt; 
%______________ Markov Process_________ 
% X = Summation of (A*X(i)) 
% ; where i = 0,1,2,...Time 
for i = 1:1:Divisions 
B=zeros(64); 
B(1,1)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all4+lambda_all5+lambda
_all6); 
B(2,1)=lambda_all6; 
B(2,2)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all4+lambda_all5); 
B(3,1)=lambda_all5; 
B(3,3)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all4+lambda_all6); 
B(4,1)=lambda_all4; 
B(4,4)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all5+lambda_all6); 
B(5,1)=lambda_all3; 
B(5,5)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all4+lambda_all5+lambda_all6); 
B(6,1)=lambda_all2; 
B(6,6)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all3+lambda_all4+lambda_all5+lambda_all6); 
B(7,1)=lambda_all1; 
B(7,7)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all4+lambda_all5+lambda_all6); 
B(8,2)=lambda_all5; 
B(8,3)=lambda_all6; 
B(8,8)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all4); 
B(9,2)=lambda_all4; 
B(9,4)=lambda_all6; 
B(9,9)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all5); 
B(10,2)=lambda_all3; 
B(10,5)=lambda_all6; 
B(10,10)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all4+lambda_all5); 
B(11,2)=lambda_all2; 
B(11,6)=lambda_all6; 
B(11,11)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all3+lambda_all4+lambda_all5); 
B(12,2)=lambda_all1; 
B(12,7)=lambda_all6; 
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B(12,12)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all4+lambda_all5); 
B(13,3)=lambda_all4; 
B(13,4)=lambda_all5; 
B(13,13)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all6); 
B(14,3)=lambda_all3; 
B(14,5)=lambda_all5; 
B(14,14)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all6+lambda_all4); 
B(15,3)=lambda_all2; 
B(15,6)=lambda_all5; 
B(15,15)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all3+lambda_all6+lambda_all4); 
B(16,3)=lambda_all1; 
B(16,7)=lambda_all5; 
B(16,16)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all4+lambda_all6); 
B(17,4)=lambda_all3; 
B(17,5)=lambda_all4; 
B(17,17)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all6+lambda_all5); 
B(18,4)=lambda_all2; 
B(18,6)=lambda_all4; 
B(18,18)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all3+lambda_all6+lambda_all5); 
B(19,4)=lambda_all1; 
B(19,7)=lambda_all4; 
B(19,19)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all6+lambda_all5); 
B(20,5)=lambda_all2; 
B(20,6)=lambda_all3; 
B(20,20)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all4+lambda_all5+lambda_all6); 
B(21,5)=lambda_all1; 
B(21,7)=lambda_all3; 
B(21,21)=-1*(lambda_all5+lambda_all2+lambda_all6+lambda_all4); 
B(22,6)=lambda_all1; 
B(22,7)=lambda_all2; 
B(22,22)=-1*(lambda_all5+lambda_all6+lambda_all3+lambda_all4); 
B(23,8)=lambda_all4; 
B(23,9)=lambda_all5; 
B(23,13)=lambda_all6; 
B(23,23)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all3); 
B(24,8)=lambda_all3; 
B(24,10)=lambda_all5; 
B(24,14)=lambda_all6; 
B(24,24)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all4);  
B(25,8)=lambda_all2; 
B(25,11)=lambda_all5; 
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B(25,15)=lambda_all6; 
B(25,25)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all4+lambda_all3); 
B(26,8)=lambda_all1; 
B(26,12)=lambda_all5; 
B(26,16)=lambda_all6; 
B(26,26)=-1*(lambda_all4+lambda_all2+lambda_all3); 
B(27,9)=lambda_all3; 
B(27,10)=lambda_all4; 
B(27,17)=lambda_all6; 
B(27,27)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all5); 
B(28,9)=lambda_all2; 
B(28,11)=lambda_all4; 
B(28,18)=lambda_all6; 
B(28,28)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all3+lambda_all5); 
B(29,9)=lambda_all1; 
B(29,12)=lambda_all4; 
B(29,19)=lambda_all6; 
B(29,29)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all5+lambda_all3); 
B(30,10)=lambda_all2; 
B(30,11)=lambda_all3; 
B(30,20)=lambda_all6; 
B(30,30)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all5+lambda_all4); 
B(31,10)=lambda_all1; 
B(31,12)=lambda_all3; 
B(31,21)=lambda_all6; 
B(31,31)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all4+lambda_all5); 
B(32,11)=lambda_all1; 
B(32,12)=lambda_all2; 
B(32,22)=lambda_all6; 
B(32,32)=-1*(lambda_all3+lambda_all5+lambda_all4); 
B(33,13)=lambda_all3; 
B(33,14)=lambda_all4; 
B(33,17)=lambda_all5; 
B(33,33)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all6); 
B(34,13)=lambda_all2; 
B(34,15)=lambda_all4; 
B(34,18)=lambda_all5; 
B(34,34)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all3+lambda_all6); 
  
B(35,13)=lambda_all1; 
B(35,16)=lambda_all4; 
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B(35,19)=lambda_all5; 
B(35,35)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all6); 
B(36,14)=lambda_all2; 
B(36,15)=lambda_all3; 
B(36,20)=lambda_all5; 
B(36,36)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all6+lambda_all4); 
B(37,14)=lambda_all1; 
B(37,16)=lambda_all3; 
B(37,21)=lambda_all5; 
B(37,37)=-1*(lambda_all6+lambda_all2+lambda_all4); 
B(38,15)=lambda_all1; 
B(38,16)=lambda_all2; 
B(38,22)=lambda_all5; 
B(38,38)=-1*(lambda_all6+lambda_all3+lambda_all4); 
B(39,17)=lambda_all2; 
B(39,18)=lambda_all3; 
B(39,20)=lambda_all4; 
B(39,39)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all5+lambda_all6); 
B(40,17)=lambda_all1; 
B(40,19)=lambda_all3; 
B(40,21)=lambda_all5; 
B(40,40)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all5+lambda_all6); 
B(41,18)=lambda_all1; 
B(41,19)=lambda_all2; 
B(41,22)=lambda_all4; 
B(41,41)=-1*(lambda_all3+lambda_all5+lambda_all6); 
B(42,20)=lambda_all1; 
B(42,21)=lambda_all2; 
B(42,22)=lambda_all3; 
B(42,42)=-1*(lambda_all4+lambda_all5+lambda_all6); 
B(43,39)=lambda_all1; 
B(43,40)=lambda_all2; 
B(43,41)=lambda_all3; 
B(43,42)=lambda_all4; 
B(43,43)=-1*(lambda_all5+lambda_all6); 
B(44,36)=lambda_all1; 
B(44,37)=lambda_all2; 
B(44,38)=lambda_all3; 
B(44,42)=lambda_all5; 
B(44,44)=-1*(lambda_all4+lambda_all6);  
B(45,34)=lambda_all1; 
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B(45,35)=lambda_all2; 
B(45,38)=lambda_all4; 
B(45,41)=lambda_all5; 
B(45,45)=-1*(lambda_all6+lambda_all3); 
B(46,33)=lambda_all1; 
B(46,35)=lambda_all3; 
B(46,37)=lambda_all4; 
B(46,40)=lambda_all5; 
B(46,46)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all6); 
B(47,33)=lambda_all2; 
B(47,34)=lambda_all3; 
B(47,36)=lambda_all4; 
B(47,39)=lambda_all5; 
B(47,47)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all6); 
B(48,30)=lambda_all1; 
B(48,31)=lambda_all2; 
B(48,32)=lambda_all3; 
B(48,42)=lambda_all6; 
B(48,48)=-1*(lambda_all4+lambda_all5); 
B(49,28)=lambda_all1; 
B(49,29)=lambda_all2; 
B(49,32)=lambda_all4; 
B(49,41)=lambda_all6; 
B(49,49)=-1*(lambda_all3+lambda_all5); 
B(50,27)=lambda_all1; 
B(50,29)=lambda_all3; 
B(50,31)=lambda_all4; 
B(50,40)=lambda_all6; 
B(50,50)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all5); 
B(51,27)=lambda_all2; 
B(51,28)=lambda_all3; 
B(51,30)=lambda_all4; 
B(51,39)=lambda_all6; 
B(51,51)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all5); 
B(52,25)=lambda_all1; 
B(52,26)=lambda_all2; 
B(52,32)=lambda_all5; 
B(52,38)=lambda_all6; 
B(52,52)=-1*(lambda_all3+lambda_all4); 
B(53,24)=lambda_all1; 
B(53,26)=lambda_all3; 
109 
 
B(53,31)=lambda_all5; 
B(53,37)=lambda_all6; 
B(53,53)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all4); 
B(54,24)=lambda_all2; 
B(54,25)=lambda_all3; 
B(54,30)=lambda_all5; 
B(54,36)=lambda_all6; 
B(54,54)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all4); 
B(55,23)=lambda_all1; 
B(55,26)=lambda_all4; 
B(55,29)=lambda_all5; 
B(55,35)=lambda_all6; 
B(55,55)=-1*(lambda_all3+lambda_all2); 
B(56,23)=lambda_all2; 
B(56,25)=lambda_all4; 
B(56,28)=lambda_all5; 
B(56,34)=lambda_all6; 
B(56,56)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all3); 
B(27,23)=lambda_all3; 
B(57,24)=lambda_all4; 
B(57,27)=lambda_all5; 
B(57,33)=lambda_all6; 
B(57,57)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all1);  
B(58,47)=lambda_all1; 
B(58,46)=lambda_all2; 
B(58,45)=lambda_all3; 
B(58,44)=lambda_all4; 
B(58,43)=lambda_all5; 
B(58,58)=-1*(lambda_all6); 
B(59,51)=lambda_all1; 
B(59,50)=lambda_all2; 
B(59,49)=lambda_all3; 
B(59,48)=lambda_all4; 
B(59,43)=lambda_all6; 
B(59,59)=-1*(lambda_all5); 
B(60,54)=lambda_all1; 
B(60,53)=lambda_all2; 
B(60,52)=lambda_all3; 
B(60,48)=lambda_all5; 
B(60,44)=lambda_all6; 
B(60,60)=-1*(lambda_all4); 
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B(61,56)=lambda_all1; 
B(61,55)=lambda_all2; 
B(61,52)=lambda_all4; 
B(61,49)=lambda_all5; 
B(61,45)=lambda_all6; 
B(61,61)=-1*(lambda_all3); 
B(62,57)=lambda_all1; 
B(62,55)=lambda_all3; 
B(62,53)=lambda_all4; 
B(62,50)=lambda_all5; 
B(62,46)=lambda_all6; 
B(62,62)=-1*(lambda_all2); 
B(63,57)=lambda_all2; 
B(63,56)=lambda_all3; 
B(63,54)=lambda_all4; 
B(63,51)=lambda_all5; 
B(63,47)=lambda_all6; 
B(63,63)=-1*(lambda_all1); 
B(64,63)=lambda_all1; 
B(64,62)=lambda_all2; 
B(64,61)=lambda_all3; 
B(64,60)=lambda_all4; 
B(64,59)=lambda_all5; 
B(64,58)=lambda_all6;  
 
G=B*X; 
X = X + G*dt; 
Rel(i)=C*X; 
Reliability = C*X; 
end 
xx=dt:dt:time; 
xx=xx.*8760;    
figure(2); 
hold on; 
plot(xx,Rel,'r'); 
hold off; 
xlabel('Time(Hours)'); 
ylabel('Reliablity'); 
  
T=sum(dt.*Rel); 
display(T) 
